Posts Tagged ‘Title VII’
Thursday, February 2nd, 2012
In one way or another, we agree to contracts with fixed terms every day: before downloading music on iTunes, buying a cell phone plan, or taking out a student loan. More and more, another area in which the terms of contracts may be non-negotiable is in the area of employment, as individuals desperate for a job agree to an employer’s conditions or risk not being hired. But what if—in addition to a set number of vacation days and an agreement not to publically disparage the employer—potential employees were also asked to commit to other, more fundamental provisions?
In fact, many employees already do.
For example: When Christa Dias of Cincinnati, Ohio, was hired as a part-time technology teacher in 2008 at Holy Family School, and in 2009 at St. Lawrence Catholic School, she had to sign employment contracts agreeing to comply with the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
Ms. Dias is not, herself, Catholic.
In October 2010, shortly after Ms. Dias asked for maternity leave, she was fired from both schools for breaching her employment contracts. Her violation? Well, it’s confusing.
Ms. Dias alleges that the schools first informed her she was being dismissed “for becoming pregnant outside of marriage,” but upon realizing that this might violate federal and state anti-discrimination laws, the schools quickly changed their tune. They now claim that they fired her for having undergone artificial insemination, which the Church views as a grave immoral act, and, they say, is in direct violation of her employment agreements, which require employees to “comply with and act consistently in accordance with the stated philosophy and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church,” part 1F. (According to Catechisms 2353, 2366, and 2376, premarital sex and pregnancy outside of marriage are frowned upon, but only artificial insemination is labeled “gravely immoral.”)
In response, Ms. Dias filed an employment discrimination suit against the two schools and the Archdiocese of Cincinnati in the U.S. District Court in April.
Does Ms. Dias have a case? Are these employment contracts enforceable? If a teacher can be fired for engaging in behavior that violates Catholic teachings, can she lose her job for using birth control? What if she has an abortion? How do courts balance employment discrimination laws against the First Amendment’s protection of religious freedom? Questions the press did not tackle. LASIS will.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers from firing employees because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In 1978, through the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Congress amended Title VII to include pregnancy discrimination within the definition of sex discrimination; women can’t be fired solely because they’re pregnant.
To make a case of sex discrimination based on pregnancy, a woman must show that she was pregnant, she was qualified for the job, she was fired, and there is a connection between her pregnancy and the termination of her employment. If she makes her case, then the burden shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory justification for firing her, maybe because she bribed her students, fell asleep in class, or posted inappropriate comments on Facebook. You can figure out how things play out from here. If the employer can’t come up with a legitimate reason for firing the employee, she wins. But if the employer offers a legitimate reason, the employer wins . . . unless the teacher proves that the school’s explanation was merely an excuse to hide its discriminatory conduct.
If she weren’t working for religious institutions, it appears that Ms. Dias would have a clear case of sex discrimination: she was pregnant, by all accounts she performed her job well, she was fired, and there is a connection between her termination and pregnancy.
But Ms. Dias did work for religious institutions, and so we continue our way through this legal maze, and ask: When a religious institution claims that it fired an employee for a religious reason, should courts look into whether the stated reason is just a pretext to hide its discriminatory conduct? This investigation into the employer’s motivation can entangle the government in religious issues, and some courts are not so keen to engage in this inquiry. For example, in 1991 the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that, under the First Amendment, a court must accept a church’s religious justification for dismissing an employee without question. Fortunately for Ms. Dias, the Sixth Circuit is more willing to explore whether an employer’s stated reason for firing its employee is genuine.
In cases when a school initially told its teacher she was being fired for certain conduct and then changed its reason to a religious one, some courts are more likely to disbelieve the school’s “on-second-thought” religious reason for dismissal. This may bode well for Ms. Dias.
In addition, the provision of Ms. Dias’ employment contract in which she agreed to follow the teachings of the Catholic Church doesn’t necessarily doom her case. Employment contracts and handbooks requiring employees to follow specific church teachings are common in religious schools, but the terms of the contracts are still subject to Title VII. A court will refuse to enforce a contract if an employee can show that it was not applied equally to men and women, in which case the court will view the policy as a ploy to engage in sex discrimination.
In a 1999 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals case, the court explained that for a school to enforce its policy against premarital sex solely by observing the pregnancy of its female teachers would constitute a form of pregnancy discrimination. So Ms. Dias can win if she demonstrates that the schools only enforced this provision against women. The fact that in 2002 the Archdiocese of Cincinnati suspended, rather than fired, a teacher (who was also a priest) accused of sexual misconduct with two male students might weigh in her favor. We think it’s safe to wager that this kind of behavior went against church teachings and would have been prohibited under his employment contract.
Now let’s take things a step or two further. Could an employer of a religious institution regulate whether an employee uses birth control? Has an abortion?
Unlike premarital sex or artificial insemination, which may result in pregnancy, these activities are private matters that are probably difficult for an employer to discover. But suppose a teacher in a Catholic school confides in a coworker that she had an abortion and this coworker tells the school administration. Under Title VII, could the school fire the teacher, if the teacher agreed to these terms when she was hired? If the policy is applied equally to men and women, the answer will most likely be “yes.”
You may be thinking, “But doesn’t the fact that men can’t have abortions automatically make any policy against abortions discriminatory?” Not necessarily (!)
If the policy doesn’t target abortions specifically but rather requires employees to abide by Catholic teachings in general, it’s not discriminatory on its face. So the only way to maintain an employment discrimination claim is to show that, although the policy is “facially neutral,” it’s not applied equally to men and women. This can be demonstrated with proof that a male teacher who also violated the employer’s policy was not fired even though the school was aware of his misconduct as well.
But before you start breaking out the champagne for Ms. Dias: There is an ever-expanding exception to employment discrimination cases against religious institutions that may negate the possibility of Ms. Dias winning her case altogether. In 1972, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals first recognized the “ministerial exception” to Title VII, holding that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering in a church’s decision to fire a minister. Basically, religious institutions must be free to dismiss ministers for any reason, without worrying whether their decision will subject them to employment discrimination claims.
If the schools can prove that Ms. Dias served as a minister, she will be barred from bringing a Title VII claim. And courts have expanded the ministerial exception to include many employees who aren’t ordained ministers, as long as their primary duties are ministerial.
Unfortunately for Ms. Dias, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission broadened the definition of ministers under the exception even further. In that case, the plaintiff, a teacher, instructed her students on mostly secular subjects with the exception of approximately 45 minutes each day, when she taught religion and led the students in prayer. The plaintiff also completed eight college-level theological courses in order to obtain the title of “called” teacher (as opposed to “lay” teacher). According to a unanimous Supreme Court, those activities were sufficient to label the teacher a minister and dismiss the suit based on the ministerial exception to employment discrimination claims.
In her complaint, Ms. Dias states that she worked as a technology coordinator, teaching computer classes and overseeing the computer systems at the schools. There is no indication that she instructed the students on religious topics or led them in prayer. So Ms. Dias will probably not be considered a minister and the school won’t be able to use the ministerial exception as a defense to her discrimination claim.
Regardless of the outcome of her case, Ms. Dias has no regrets about having artificial insemination, and is delighted with her little girl. “I would do it all over again for her,” she said.
This blog originally appeared in Legal as She is Spoke on January 25, 2012. Legal as She is Spoke is a blog produced by New York Law School’s Program in Law and Journalism. Reprinted with permission.
About the Author: Katherine Lazarow is a staff editor for the New York Law School Law Review, a member of the Justice Action Center, and an intern at the Urban Justice Center’s Mental Health Project. Katherine graduated from McGill University in Montréal with a Bachelor’s in Sociology.
Tuesday, December 7th, 2010
Federal Employee Wins Appeal On Sex And Age Discrimination Claim
Lawyers representing employees in discrimination cases are forever frustrated by federal district court judges whom routinely grant summary judgment to employers instead of allowing cases to proceed to trial for a jury determination.
This recent case of Bartlett v.Gates, in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s summary judgment ruling, is a perfect example of what we potentially face on every case no matter what kind of evidence has been produced.
What Happened In The Case
Barry Bartlett worked for the United States Department of Defense at the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). In September of 2005, he applied for a promotion to GS-12 contracting officer. At the time of his application, Bartlett was 58 years old and had 34 years of experience as a GS-11 contract administrator. In addition, Bartlett’s resume showed:
- a record of military service
- a bachelor’s degree in history
- completed graduate course work in business administration, accounting and law
Bartlett was deemed qualified at the initial screening stage and his name was forwarded to Kathleen Lehman, the selecting official for the promotion.
Another long term employee, Marvin Greenberg, also applied for the position. Greenberg was 63 years old at the time of his application. His resume showed:
- a bachelor’s and doctoral degrees
- authorship of a length book and numerous scholarly publications
In October of 2005, without conducting any interviews, Lehman chose Angela Lucas for the promotion. Lucas, another internal candidate, was 39 years old at the time and did not have a college degree.
Bartlett claimed that between 2003 and 2005, employees who were 55 years or older received only one DCMA promotion, despite making up 36% of the agency’s workforce. He also claimed that female employees were promoted in a series of personnel decisions that involved the manipulation of agency procedures.
Bartlett decided to challenge the decision. In February of 2007, after exhausting his administrative remedies, he filed a lawsuit against the DCMA claiming that he was discriminated against because of his age and sex in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which was referred to a magistrate for a report and recommendation. In October of 2008, the magistrate issued a report which found that Bartlett established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, but the DCMA provided a non-discriminatory reason for its promotion decision and Plaintiff failed to rebut it by showing pretext.
The federal district court judge adopted the recommendation and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment against Bartlett. He appealed.
The Sixth Circuit Reverses
Burden of Proof Under The Title VII And The ADEA
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a failure to promote case when he:
- is a member of a protected class
- objectively qualified for the position
- considered for but is denied the promotion
- an individual outside of plaintiff’s protected class is selected for the position
Once the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. In order to overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff must produce evidence which can rebut the employer’s explanation demonstrating pretext – which means “only enough evidence … to rebut, but not to disprove, the defendant’s proffered rationale.”
A plaintiff can prove pretext with evidence that the employer’s stated reason for its adverse business action either
- was not the actual reason, or
- is insufficient to explain the employer’s action
It’s worth noting that the Sixth Circuit in this decision joined a number of other circuits in holding that age discrimination claims — post Gross -- should continue to be analyzed under McDonnell Douglas.
The Court’s Analysis Of The Evidence
Since the Defendant conceded that Bartlett established a prima facie case of discrimination the appeal turned on Defendant’s explanation for its decision, and whether Bartlett presented sufficient evidence of pretext to rebut it.
As to its reason, Defendant claimed that Angela Lucas was the best qualified candidate based on the written submissions of the applicants and Lehman’s personal knowledge of their background, performance, work product, and communication abilities.
It further claimed that Lucas was highly motivated, very experienced and a strong communicator who had earned performance awards and commendations of her peers.
Bartlett, it claimed in contrast, was an average employee who lacked a sufficient background in contract negotiations as well as a strong writing ability.
Bartlett offered several grounds of support for his argument for that Defendant’s reasons were pretextual.
As the Court noted, the relative qualifications of applicants as well as discriminatory remarks may establish pretext in a failure to promote case.
In this case, the Court pointed to:
- Bartlett’s 24 years of experience as a contract administrator: Lucas had 8
- Bartlett’s superior educational credentials including a bachelor’s degree and advanced course work: Lucas did not graduate from college
- Bartlett’s communication skills, as well as those of Greenberg, which were satisfactory if not superior to Lucas’s as evidenced by favorable performance reviews, education credentials, and scholarly publications and familiarity in the area of contract negotiations.
The Court stated:
Construing the fact in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, we find that while Plaintiff may not have been a “plainly superior candidate” that rendered a DCMA’s promotion decision unreasonable on its face …Plaintiff was as qualified if not more qualified than Lucas.
Although this finding does not conclusively establish pretext, it warrants denial of summary judgment where other probative evidence of discrimination is presented.
As the Court noted, discriminatory remarks may constitute direct evidence of discrimination and also serve as evidence of pretext.
In this case, Bartlett presented evidence that his supervisor, Gail Lewin, and the selecting official Kathleen Lehman:
- informed him that 34 years on the job was enough
- joked about whether he had taken up “antiquing or traveling or something like that”
- suggested that he should retire – a topic which Bartlett had neither broached nor considered
The Court stated:
Because these statements were made by DCMA decisionmakers just weeks before the promotion decision and because the ostensible motivation of the comments was to hasten Plaintiff’s departure from the agency, these remarks provide strong ‘probative evidence of pretext.’
Furthermore, when coupled with record evidence that Plaintiff was as qualified if not more qualified that the selectee, these statements created triable issues of fact on the question of pretext.
Defendant’s Explanation Was Not Believable
In addition, the Court held that Bartlett had presented evidence of pretext because the reason given for its failure to promote him was not credible.
As the Court noted, Lehman testified that she made the decision that Lucas was the best qualified candidate without conducting interviews because she was familiar with the applicants experience, backgrounds, and competency. However, when asked, Lehman was unable to answer basic questions about the candidates’ qualifications.
The Court noted:
The fact that Lehman was unable to describe the candidates’ credentials creates a triable issue of fact as to the actual basis for Defendant’s promotion decision, suggesting it was pretext for discrimination based on sex and age.
In sum, the Court concluded that Bartlett presented sufficient evidence to suggest that DCMA’s proffered explanation for its promotion decision was pretextual, and had no basis in fact. Accordingly, DCMA was not entitled to summary judgment.
The case was reversed and remanded for trial.
This case is a good example of something that’s often wrong with many federal court decisions when it comes to employment discrimination cases.
When reviewing summary judgment motions, trial court judges are, according to the Supreme Court “required to view all facts and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” In employment discrimination cases, the nonmoving party is almost always the plaintiff employee.
It’s no secret to plaintiffs’ employment lawyers that, for some reason, many trial court judges fail to abide by this requirement in case after case and instead seem to draw all inferences in favor the employer.
The result of what appears to be this employer oriented approach in discrimination cases, or as some call it — a hostility on the federal bench to employment cases —is a clogging of the docket with summary judgment motions and appeals, as well as considerable delay and expense to both sides.
It also encourages management side lawyers to file summary judgment motions in every case no matter what record of evidence has been established by the plaintiff because they just might win – and just might get affirmed or the employee might just get worn down and give up.
Mr. Bartlett filed his lawsuit in 2007. The events giving rise to claim occurred in 2005. While it’s a great victory to have won the reversal in the Court of Appeals, let’s not forget that it’s almost 2011 – and that all he has won thus far is his right to get a trial and have his case decided by a jury.
The reality is that if someone chooses to litigate an employment discrimination case, it’s virtually certain that it’s going to be a long road to justice.
This article was originally posted on Employee Rights Post.
About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the leading employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States. She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.
Wednesday, October 6th, 2010
Turning the Other Cheek: Illegal Retaliation in the Workplace
If someone went to your employer and said you were discriminating against them, wouldn’t you hold a grudge? Wouldn’t you want to get them fired, and if you couldn’t do that, at least make their lives more difficult? Of course you would (and if you honestly wouldn’t even want to, see your parish priest about nomination for sainthood and/or enjoy nirvana). That is why there is more retaliation going on in American workplaces than there is discrimination (and there is plenty of that going on too).
It is illegal under federal law (Title VII § 704) to retaliate against an employee for complaining about workplace discrimination. That applies to everyone from the employee’s supervisor all the way up the food chain to the CEO. But people being what they are, they retaliate anyway. There are many time-honored forms of illegal retaliation, among them firing, demoting, transferring, changing work schedules, cutting bonuses, assigning lame accounts or thorny clients, and general day-to-day hassling.
In the past what was and wasn’t illegal retaliation was unclear, partly because the federal appellate courts disagreed with each other about the definition, and partly because different federal courts within each circuit (i.e. group of states) agreed with each other about how to word the rule against retaliation but disagreed about what it meant. Time was that in many circuits you could get away with retaliation if you did it outside the workplace. That left the door open for prank calls, letting air out of tires, toilet papering, and any other non-work-related harassment that was short of a misdemeanor.
In some circuits, you could transfer an employee to a distant office or put the employee on the graveyard shift, as long as what you did was not a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions” of employment. In yet other circuits the line you couldn’t cross was the “ultimate employment decision,” meaning you couldn’t fire, cut pay, demote, or take other actions of similar severity, but anything less was okay. Then there were the circuits that said illegal retaliation encompassed anything that was likely to dissuade “a reasonable worker” from complaining about discrimination. Those circuits won when the Supreme Court resolved the whole mess a few years ago in a case called Burlington Northern v. White, which closed the door to retaliation outside the workplace.
In Burlington the employee, Sheila White, filed suit against her employer, Burlington Northern, for discrimination and retaliation. The retaliation she alleged consisted of changing her job responsibilities and suspending her for 37 days without pay, though the company later paid her for those 37 days. The Supreme Court decided that even though the change in her job responsibilities was not a demotion, and even though she ultimately received all of her pay, she had still suffered illegal retaliation. The change in job responsibilities was a change from the relatively clean job of operating a forklift to the much dirtier and more arduous tasks of cleaning up railroad rights of way and carrying heavy loads back and forth. And the 37 days she didn’t receive any pay included Christmas; there was no money for gifts in the White household that year. The Supreme Court said that a reasonable employee could easily look at what Burlington Northern did to White and decide that reporting discrimination to this employer just wasn’t worth it.
So, problem solved – everyone across the country now knows that even actions unrelated to the workplace can constitute retaliation. If only.
The problem with our courts is not judicial activism, but the opposite. I don’t know if it is a question of effort, ability, or just not giving a damn, but somehow courts managed to mess up the Supreme Court’s clear ruling when they tried to apply it in their own cases. One example is Hicks v. Baines, a case in the Second Circuit (which encompasses Connecticut, New York, and Vermont).
The issue that tripped up the Hicks court had to do with what is called the prima facie case, which just means that there is a certain minimum amount of evidence or argument that a plaintiff has to provide just to stay in court. Satisfying that minimum often doesn’t take much, but a plaintiff has to know what exactly to show in order to keep a case alive.
In Burlington Northern the Supreme Court made it crystal clear that you couldn’t sidestep the rule against retaliating by doing your retaliation outside of the workplace. Even if your retaliatory acts had nothing to do with the victim’s employment, they were still illegal as long as they would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination. So what does the Second Circuit in Hicks say that plaintiffs have to show to satisfy the minimal prima facie case and stay in court? An “adverse employment action.”
That’s right. According to the Second Circuit, just to keep the case alive, just to satisfy the bare minimum standard, the plaintiff has to show that the retaliation involved the employer doing something nasty that was work-related. The really jaw-dropping part is that the court laid this out in its written opinion just after a long discussion about Burlington Northern and how the Supreme Court had decided that anti-retaliation protection “extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”
Fortunately for the plaintiffs in Hicks, the retaliatory actions that they alleged were all employment-related, so the Second Circuit’s bizarre mistake did not affect the outcome of their case (for the record, they won part of it and lost part of it).
The important takeaway from Burlington: any retaliation for complaining about workplace discrimination is illegal, whether it is work-related or not, as long as it would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination. The important takeaway from Hicks: it’s not just judges’ political inclinations that you have to watch out for. Take a look at their GPAs too.
This article was originally published on PiperHoffman.com
About The Author: Piper Hofman is a writer and attorney living in Brooklyn with a B.A. magna cum laude from Brown University and a J.D. cum laude from Harvard Law School. She has professional experience with the laws related to employment, animal rights, poverty, homelessness, and women’s rights.
Friday, September 17th, 2010
After months of complaining that a female co-worker had repeatedly harassed him to have sex with her, Rudolpho Lamas’s boss offered a suggestion. Maybe, the boss said, Rudolpho should try walking around the office singing, “I’m too sexy for my shirt.” Everyone at work thought the situation was hilarious: a widower turning down the explicit sexual advances of an attractive woman. But Rudolpho Lamas and his lawyers are not laughing.
When does flirting at work cross the line and become sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Lamas’s lawyers asked. And, does Title VII impose different standards on men and women in sexual harassment cases? Finally, do gender stereotypes have a place in the jurisprudence of Title VII?
Earlier this month the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco answered Rudolpho’s attorneys’ questions in a case involving a man who alleged he had been sexually harassed by a female co-worker in direct violation of Title VII. (E.E.O.C. v. Prospect Airport Services (9th Cir. 9/3/2010).) The Court’s decision is interesting, not so much for its ultimate finding—that Title VII indeed provides equal protection to male and female victims of sexual harassment is well established—but for the way the Court considers socio-cultural stereotypes about gender in the context of a Title VII claim.
Before turning to the drama of E.E.O.C. v. Prospect Airport Services, a few words about the stage on which Rudolpho Lamas’s story is now playing out.
It is illegal to discriminate in the terms and conditions of employment based on the gender of a person under Title VII of the Civil Right Act. Under Title VII, sexual harassment is considered to be a form of sex discrimination.
A Title VII sex harassment claim can be based on two theories of liability: (1) economic quid pro quo; or (2) hostile environment.
In a typical case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, “a supervisor relies upon his [or her] apparent or actual authority to extort sexual consideration from an employee.” Hensen v. City of Dundee 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). “Have sex with me,” says the supervisor, “and you’ll get that promotion.”
In a hostile work environment Title VII case, a co-worker or a supervisor’s gender-biased conduct is so severe or pervasive that the employee’s work environment is severely impacted. “[W]hen a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor “discriminate[s]” on the basis of sex.” Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 US 57 (1986). And, of course, that is what Title VII’s gender provisions guard against: discrimination based on sex.
This month’s Ninth Circuit case was based on the second of these two Title VII liability theories. To maintain a gender-based, hostile environment case, a worker must show that:
(1) he or she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
(2) the conduct was unwelcome, and
(3) the conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir.1991)
Element 1: Conduct of a sexual nature
Lamas presented evidence that a female co-worker repeatedly asked him to go out with her and on several occasions made explicit references to her desire to have sex with him. She wrote to him, “I’ve been thinking of you a lot lately. I’ve been having crazy dreams about us in the bath tub yeah in the bath tub… Seriously, I do want you sexually and romantically!”
The Court had no trouble finding that the conduct was sexual. “She performed gestures simulating fellatio, and gave him a photograph of herself emphasizing her breasts and possibly without clothes on. Her proposition was for sex, not a cup of coffee together.”
Having established the conduct was of a sexual nature, the Court went on to consider whether Lamas might have welcomed the conduct.
Element 2: Welcomeness
The Court next considered how the welcomeness element of the three-part prima facie case must be proved in a case involving a male victim and female harasser. What evidence does a male victim of sexual harassment need to present to establish that the sexual advances of a co-worker were unwelcome? The short answer is, the same evidence a woman needs to present.
Lamas’s employer apparently argued in the lower court that men are more likely than women to welcome the sexual advances of a co-worker. Even Lamas admitted that “most men in his circumstances” would have welcomed the invitations. So, what did the Ninth Circuit think about this digression into cultural stereotypes? Not much.
The Court was quick to point out that suppositions about what most men wanted at work was itself a stereotype and, thus, was not evidence of anything. “[W]elcomeness is inherently subjective, (since the interest two individuals might have in a romantic relationship is inherently individual to them), so it does not matter to welcomeness whether other men might have welcomed Munoz’s sexual propositions.”
“Title VII is not a beauty contest, and even if Munoz looks like Marilyn Monroe, Lamas might not want to have sex with her, for all sorts of possible reasons.” Though the reference to Marilyn Monroe is a bit old school, the message is clear and contemporary. Men, like woman, have lots of reasons to reject sexual advances by co-workers, including religious beliefs, fear of sexual harassment lawsuits, fear of complications in the workplace, fear of pregnancy or, as the Court explained, fears about facing two decades of child support payments. Or, the Court explained, “[Lamas] might feel that something was mentally off about a woman that sexually aggressive toward him. Some men might feel that chivalry obligates a man to say yes, but the law does not.”
While the Court focused on the subjectivities of welcomeness, it observed that welcomeness has an objective component as well. To hold the employer liable under Title VII, the unwelcomeness must be communicated. The employer must be told about the harassment so it can evaluate and respond to the allegations. “Sometimes the past conduct of the individuals and the surrounding circumstances may suggest that conduct claimed to be unwelcome was merely part of a continuing course of conduct that had been welcomed warmly until some promotion was denied or employment was terminated. That is a credibility issue.”
Element 3: Severe or Pervasive
Title VII is not a “general civility code” either. It is not meant to protect workers against “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.” Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 US 775 (1998).
Title VII is designed to provide legal remedies to those employees who have been subjected to significant gender-based harassment and discrimination. In other words, it protects employees who have been subjected to sexual conduct that is severe or pervasive.
Some conduct, such as a sexual assault of a co-worker, is severe enough to provide an immediate remedy to a worker under Title VII. A sexual assault immediately creates an abusive working environment.
Less egregious conduct can provide grounds for a Title VII claim, as well, if: (1) it happens often; and (2) it is of such nature that it is offensive to both the victim and a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances.
Having a co-worker flash a nude picture of himself (or herself) to you one time at a holiday party might be offensive. The one-time, alcohol-driven transgression of a co-worker would not provide grounds for a Title VII claim, however. But what if a co-worker (male or female) constantly displayed pornography on his (or her) computer in a cubicle shared with another worker? What if this conduct was part of an attitude that permeated the workplace with gender bias? If the cubicle mate’s objections and complaints were ignored by the employer, and the conduct continued, it might become pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the workplace in violation of Title VII.
Most Title VII claims involve a series of such increasingly troublesome events, none of which alone would support a strong Title VII lawsuit. But taken together, they often do. So, on a behavioral scale ranging from off-color jokes to things you only see on Mad Men episodes, the case law teaches that the more outrageous the conduct, the fewer times it must occur to be actionable, and vice versa. The courts treat it as a classic inverse relationship.
Putting It All Together
By looking at the all of the circumstances of the workplace in Prospect Airport Services, the Ninth Circuit found sufficient evidence of unlawful sexual harassment to send the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. The female employee’s conduct obviously was sexual. And Lamas made it clear that he wanted the conduct to stop. The conduct was pervasive and had a serious negative impact on conditions at work. Lamas’s job performance suffered. When the harasser told her co-workers about her efforts to seduce the victim, they mocked Lamas and questioned his sexuality. Lamas complained several times to his supervisors about the harassment, but nothing was done.
If Rudolpho Lamas can convince a jury that all of this is true, then he will have proved all of the elements of a Title VII sex harassment case.
Guidelines for Flirting at Work?
In its decision earlier this month, the Ninth Circuit made it clear it does not consider all romantic overtures, or even all sexual propositions, to constitute unlawful sexual harassment
People spend most of their waking hours with other people at their workplaces, so that is where many meet and begin social relationships, and someone has to make the first overture. Some people have more social finesse than others, and many might suggest coffee or a trip to an art exhibition rather than sex, but mere awkwardness is insufficient to establish the “severe or pervasive” element.
Directly propositioning a co-worker to have sex might be incredibly cheeky and against company policy (it could get a person fired), but it does not violate Title VII. “Had Munoz merely asked Lamas to go out on a date, or to see whether they might have a romantic relationship, or straightforwardly propositioned him for sex, and then quit when he clearly told her no, the EEOC would not have shown enough evidence to survive summary judgment.”
Does this mean that acting like a normal, socio-sexual human being at work is legal under federal law? Undoubtedly so; but the definition of normal remains as subject to context, credibility and the uncertainties of the civil litigation system as ever before.
Has the Ninth Circuit now established federal guidelines for flirting at work that are applicable to men and women across the country? Not really. But, what the Court has done is to restate well established principles of law: men and women have identical employment rights, as well as identical burdens of proof, in sexual harassment cases brought under the Civil Rights Act.
About the Author: Patrick Kitchin is a labor rights attorney with offices in San Francisco and Alameda, California. He has represented thousands of employees in both individual and class action cases involving violations of California and federal labor laws since founding his firm in 1999. According to retail experts and the media, his wage and hour class actions against Polo Ralph Lauren, Gap, Banana Republic, and Chico’s led to substantial changes in the retail industry’s labor practices in California. Patrick is a 1992 graduate of The University of Michigan Law School and is personally and professionally committed to the protection of workers’ rights everywhere. For more information about his practice you can visit his website here.
Friday, May 14th, 2010
Hearings Held On Federal Discrimination Bill To Overturn Gross Decision
Last week, both the House and Senate held hearings on the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act (POWADA) (H.R. 3721, S. 1756). The legislation would overturn the awful Gross v. FBL Financials Services, Inc. case decided by the Supreme Court last year. If passed, the bill will apply retroactively to all cases pending on or after June 17, 2009, the date of the Gross decision.
Simply stated, the Gross decision holds age discrimination plaintiffs to a higher standard of proof than other victims of discrimination by requiring them to prove that their age was the “but for” cause of the employer’s adverse decision instead of “a motivating factor.” I predicted, as did others, that Gross would get a Congressional fix and that’s exactly what POWADA does – and more.
For one, POWADA allows the plaintiff to win an age discrimination case by proving that:
(A) an impermissible factor under the Act (the discrimination statute) was a motivating factor for the practice complained of — even if other factors also motivated the practice, or
(B) the practice complained of would not have occurred in the absence of an impermissible factor.
The legislation also establishes that:
- standards of proof for all federal laws forbidding discrimination and retaliation (including whistleblowing) are the same
- the plaintiff can choose the method of proof for the case, including the McDonnell Douglas framework
- employees can rely on any type or form of admissible circumstantial or direct evidence to prove their discrimination and retaliation cases
The Act explicitly states that the standard for proving unlawful disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and other anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws is no different than the standard of proof under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
In other words, all plaintiffs in discrimination cases will be held to the same standards of proof and will be able to prove their discrimination cases in the same way. While this is most certainly what Congress intended in the first place, it will be very beneficial for all of us who litigate these cases — and our clients — to have these evidentiary matters settled once and for all.
*This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on May 9, 2010. Reprinted with permission.
About the Author: Ellen Simon: is recognized as one of the leading employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States.She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.
Wednesday, March 17th, 2010
Direct Evidence Of Age Discrimination Gets Plaintiff Jury Trial: Court Wrongfully Applied Mixed Motive Standard To Bounce The Case
It’s hard to believe that this age discrimination victim got thrown out of court and had to go to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a reversal but here’s what happened in the recently decided case of Mora v. Jackson Memorial Hospital.
Facts Of The Case
Sixty-two year old Josephine Mora worked for Jackson Memorial Hospital (“Hospital”) as a fundraiser. She initially worked for someone named Chea who recommended to the Hospital’s chief executive, Rodriguez, that she be fired. The reasons for the recommendation are not set out in the opinion.
Rodriguez first agreed, but then decided to give Mora a different position in his own office “where he could observe her more closely.” Mora worked with Rodriguez for a month. Rodriguez claimed during that time Mora was responsible for several errors and displayed a lack of professionalism.
At the end of the month, Rodriguez fired Mora. When he did so, according to Mora, Rodriguez called her into his office and said:
I need someone younger I can pay less … I need Elena [Quevedo, a 25 year old employee]
In addition, one employee heard Rodriguez tell Mora:
You are very old and inept. What you should be doing is taking care of old people. They really need you. I need somebody younger that I can pay less and I can control.
Another employee heard Rodriguez say “she’s too old to be working here anyway” in reference to Mora.
In the course of Mora’s lawsuit filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, (“ADEA”) Rodriguez denied making these discriminatory remarks. In addition, the Hospital argued that even if it did discriminate against Mora, she would have been fired anyway because of poor performance.
The district court agreed with the defendant, concluded that the Hospital had met its burden under the “same decision” affirmative defense, and granted judgment in favor of the Hospital. Mora appealed.
The Eleventh Circuit Reverses
Mixed Motive Analysis Wrongfully Applied
Part of the reason why the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision was because it found that the district court wrongfully applied a Title VII mixed motive analysis to an ADEA case.
The discussion involves a lot of complicated and tortured law, but here’s the simplest I can make it.
In the landmark Supreme Court case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decided in 1989, the evidence showed that the partners at Price Waterhouse made sexist remarks and engaged in gender stereotyping when they denied Ann Hopkins partnership in the firm. In other words, there was direct evidence of discrimination.
In its holding the Supreme Court set out a new standard which could be applied to cases with direct evidence of discrimination. In sum, when a plaintiff shows that race or sex discrimination was a motivating or substantial factor in an employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it would have made the same decision anyway (in the absence of the discriminatory motive.)
Since the Price Waterhouse decision, this kind of discrimination case is often referred to as a “mixed motive case” with a “same decision defense.”
In Moro’s case, the district court applied the Price Waterhouse mixed motive analysis and ruled that the Hospital proved its “same decision” defense. It concluded that Mora ‘s termination was inevitable given the number and severity of her workplace problems and that no reasonable jury could find otherwise. And so she lost as a matter of law.
The problem with the district court’s ruling — according to the 11th Circuit — is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBIS Financial Services (2009) held that the Price Waterhouse mixed motive burden shifting analysis only applied to discrimination claims brought under Title VII and did not apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. ( I wrote about the awful Gross case here and here)
Consequently, since the mixed motive burden shifting analysis was wrongly applied, the defense was not entitled to its same decision defense, and the district court’s reliance on that defense in finding against the plaintiff was reversible error.
The Jury Should Decide Whether Mora Was Fired Because Of Her Age
After the 11th Circuit explained why the district court’s analysis was wrong, it went on to explain what the correct analysis is – and unlike the above discussion, it’s all very straightforward from there.
A plaintiff in an ADEA case may prove illegal age discrimination with either direct or circumstantial evidence. Moro testified that she was fired because of her age, and two co-employees substantiated her. The Hospital denied that the comments were made which meant that material facts were in dispute and the case properly belonged in front of a jury.
As the Court put it:
The resolution of this case depends on whose account of the pertinent conversations a jury would credit. …..
A reasonable juror could find that Rodriguez’s statements should be taken at face value and that he fired Plaintiff because of her age. For us to conclude otherwise would be to deny Plaintiff the benefit of resolving all reasonable inferences in her favor as the nonmoving party.
Given the disputed question of material fact, Defendant was unentitled to a summary judgment.
It’s awfully common for people to be let go because they are considered by some to be too old and too expensive. I can’t count the number of times I have represented people who were fired for just those reasons.
In this case, Josephine Mora was told, “you’re too old. I need to find someone younger and cheaper.” If it’s not a case of age discrimination, I don’t know what is.
It’s both astounding and disheartening that forty three years after the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, a court faced with such strong evidence of age discrimination could throw the plaintiff out, grant judgment in favor of the employer, and deprive the employee of her right to a jury trial
It’s a good thing the Eleventh Circuit fixed the mistake and published this opinion, because if this woman can’t get her age discrimination case in front of a jury, I have a hard time figuring out who can.
About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the first and foremost employment and civil rights attorneys in the United States, Ellen Simon has been lauded for her work on landmark cases that established employment law in both state and federal court. A sought-after legal analyst and expert, she discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post www.employeerightspost.com/ has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. Learn more about Ellen Simon at www.ellensimon.net/.
Thursday, December 17th, 2009
An amendment that would prevent the government from working with contractors who deny victims of sexual assault the right to bring their case in court has survived attempts to dull its impact and seems poised to become law.
The Senate Committee on Appropriation passed, on Tuesday, a defense appropriations bill that included the “anti-rape” amendment introduced by Sen. Al Franken (D-Minn.). The legislation was intended to address and prevent a recurrence of the assault and rape that Jamie Leigh Jones, a defense contractor for the company KBR, alleged was committed by her fellow employees. But the amendment became a subject of debate after the Department of Defense, Republicans in the Senate, and even the committee chairman, Sen. Dan Inouye (D-Hawaii) raised concerns that it would leave contractors over exposed to lawsuits.
Photo: Huffington Post
The final product, in the end, proved remarkably strong. According to a Franken aide, the substance of the language “is unchanged.” Under the amendment the government would not be able to do business with companies that deny court hearings for victims of either assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligent hiring practice. The controversial Title VII provision, which would allow victims of assault to sue the employers of the alleged perpetrator and not just the perpetrator himself or herself, remains in the bill. Meanwhile, the threshold at which companies will be subjected to the legislation is set at those who have contracts totaling $1 million or more.
All told, the legislation would affect all major and many minor contractors, forcing them to choose between allowing litigation for their employees or forfeiting the hundreds of millions in dollars that are doled out annually in contracts by the federal government.
The Franken amendment includes a national security waiver, meaning that the Department of Defense could circumvent the law if it is deemed dangerous to U.S. safety. But, for that to happen, the Secretary of Defense would have to “personally explain why the waiver was used to Congress and at that point make it public,” the Franken aide explained.
“I came to Washington to stand up for folks like Jamie Leigh, and stand up to the powerful interests that too often silence their voices,” Sen. Franken said in a statement. “I was gratified to see so many of my colleagues in Congress and so many national civil rights leaders join in this effort. The Jamie Leigh Jones amendment is on its way to becoming law thanks to their work, the work of Chairman Inouye, and the work of the White House. I’m pleased that together, we were able to find a solution that allows victims of assault and discrimination their rightful day in court.”
The amendment was initially added to the defense appropriations bill on October 21, 2009 by a 68 to 30 vote. Despite wide support for the measure (and ridicule for the 30 Republicans who opposed it) both the Obama administration’s Department of Defense and Chairman Inouye raised concerns while the legislation was being considered in conference committee. Attempts to strip it of the Title VII provision were met with public outcry, which a Senate source familiar with the negotiations says was partially responsible for its ultimate passage.
“The public support surprised a lot of senators and not just the chairman,” said the source. “The White House was working with Franken’s office to find language that would be enforceable… and I think by the time those talks began everyone was on board, including Chairman Inouye.”
*This article was originally published in the Huffington Post on December 16, 2009. Reprinted with permission from the author.
About the Author: Sam Stein is a Political Reporter at the Huffington Post, based in Washington, D.C. Previously he has worked for Newsweek magazine, the New York Daily News and the investigative journalism group Center for Public Integrity. He has a masters from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and is a graduate of Dartmouth College. Sam can be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Tuesday, November 17th, 2009
Sex Discrimination Against Men Violates Title VII
Sex Discrimination Against Men Violates Title VII
It’s not often that you see cases involving discrimination against men, but in the last few weeks the EEOC has reported two noteworthy settlements.
The Sex Discrimination Case Against Lawry’s
In early November, the EEOC announced a $1,025,000 settlement of a class action lawsuit against Lawry’s Restaurants Inc., which operates steak houses in Las Vegas, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Beverly Hills and Corona del Mar, California.
In the lawsuit, the EEOC charged Lawry’s with maintaining a longstanding company wide policy of hiring only women for server positions.
The policy, which has been in place since 1938, is in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits discrimination because of sex.
Lawry’s claimed that the policy was based on long standing tradition. The EEOC found that the policy adversely affected a class of men on the basis of sex.
The parties reached an agreement to settle the case in early November. Under the consent decree Lawry’s agreed to:
- change its practice and actively promote the hiring of men into server positions
- provide monetary relief including a class fund of $500,000
- pay over $300,000 to initiate an advertising campaign regarding the hiring of food servers
- pay $225,000 for training its employees on compliance with Title VII and related laws
- take additional steps to insure compliance with Title VII and the decree
In its announcement of the settlement, Olophious E. Perry, who managed the EEOC investigation said:
The EEOC will never condone discrimination in the name of so-called tradition. Every individual deserves a fair chance to obtain a job based on their talent and qualifications, regardless of gender.
It seems to me that there are lots of restaurants out there that still have male only, or female only servers. This case makes it clear that this is one “tradition” that has seen its day.
Cheesecake Factory Settles Case Of Male On Male Sexual Harassment
The EEOC announced this week that Cheesecake Factory, Inc, a nationwide restaurant chain, will pay $345,000 to settle a sexual harassment suit involving six male employees who were subjected to repeated sexual harassment at the company’s Chandler Mall location outside of Phoenix.
The complaint charged that the restaurant knew about and tolerated repeated sexual assaults against six male employees by a group of kitchen staffers.
The evidence included abuse involving the harassers:
- directly touching the victims’ genitals
- making sexually charged remarks
- grinding their genitals against them
- forcing victims into repeated episodes of simulated rape
According to the EEOC, managers witnessed employees dragging their victims kicking and screaming into the refrigerator. Victims’ complaints were made to virtually every manager in the restaurant but the conduct never stopped. Eventually the police were called and an EEOC charge was filed.
Mary Jo O’Neill, Regional Attorney of the EEOC’s Phoenix office had this to say:
The evidence was clear, and everyone knew about it. Behind the lavish décor that the company boasts on its web site was a horribly dysfunctional workplace where male workers lived in fear.
I would like to think that this situation is unusual, but the EEOC’s Phoenix District Office’s press release points out that it’s currently prosecuting a similar case against Fleming’s Prime Steak House.
What’s with these restaurants?
Lessons To Be Learned
When most of us think about sex discrimination, we think about discrimination against women, and that’s certainly what was contemplated when the “because of sex” language was added to Title VII.
(Interestingly, the addition of “sex” by a southern congressman to Title VII in 1964 was seen by most as a cynical attempt to torpedo the bill which was primarily targeted to address race discrimination)
Likewise, when most of us think about sexual harassment, we think of men as the harassers and women as the victims.
(Not so, said the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,Inc in 1998; for more on this topic, see my article: What’s Going On With Male On Male Sexual Harassment )
These recent EEOC cases draw attention to the fact that men can be victims of gender discrimination as well as outrageous sexual harassment. Both forms of discrimination are against the law and can lead to serious consequences for all involved.
About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the first and foremost employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States. With more than $50* million in verdicts and settlements and over 30 years of experience, Ellen has been listed in Best Lawyers in America and in the National Law Journal as one of the nation’s leading litigators. She has been lauded for her work on landmark cases that established employment law in both state and federal court. Ellen also possesses a wealth of knowledge as a legal analyst discussing high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and women’s issues. Ms. Simon has been quoted often in local and national news media and is a regular guest on television and radio, including appearances on Court TV. She is the author of the Employee Rights Post, a legal blog devoted to employee and civil rights.
*prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome
Thursday, April 30th, 2009
In the spirit of National Equal Pay Day on Tuesday, I wanted to share the important gender discrimination case of Donlin v. Phillips Lighting North America Corp. decided by the Third Circuit last week.
Here’s what happened in the case.
Colleen Donlin was hired by Phillips as a temporary warehouse employee at its Mountaintop, Pennsylvania distributions center. Her job was to help prepare orders for shipment.
Like other temporary workers, Donlin applied for a permanent position. She was not hired and her eight month temporary assignment ended.
Donlin got two other jobs after she left Philips. At the first job, Donlin earned $14.70 an hour, but it was a 32-mile commute.
She left that job and found a job closer to home at which she made $13.00 an an hour. Had she been hired by Philips, she would have earned $14.67 an hour as a base salary
Donlin learned that Phillips hired several men for the position she had applied for after it refused to hire her. She filed a Title VII lawsuit for gender discrimination, won the trial and was awarded damages.
In discrimination cases, the compensation which can be awarded by a judge or jury is designed to make victims whole and put them in the position they would have been in had they not been discriminated against.
A winning employee can recover “back pay” and “front pay.”
- Back pay represents losses from the the time of the discrimination up to the time of trial.
- Front pay represents the losses that the victim will experience in the future if he or she does not find a comparable position.
Based on the premise that Donlin would have worked for another 25 years, an advisory jury awarded Donlin:
The award was based on the difference in pay and benefits between the $13.00 hour job she was holding at the time of trial and the $14.67 hour job she would have had at Phillips had she not been discriminated against when Phillips refused to hire her.
The judge modified the front-pay award by reducing it to account for 10 years of damages instead of 25, finding that a 25 year period was too speculative — so the total award was $164,850.
Phillips appealed and the decision came out last week. The issues decided are very important for both victims of discrimination and their lawyers.
Here are the highlights:
1. Front Pay:
Donlin was in her 30′s at the time of her employment with Phillips and 40 at the time of trial. The question presented was: was how far into the future can a younger employee like Donlin claim economic loss?
For those of us who represent individuals in employment cases, the issue has always been a hard one to deal with when it comes to a younger worker. The reason is because past damages can be calculated with certainty, but future losses can not:
- Is the person going to get another job?
- If so when and for how much?
- How do we know what someone will be doing 20 or 30 years from now?
When we represent someone in an age discrimination case, and the terminated employee is 55 for example, it’s easy for us to project damages until age 65 or 70 (whatever the age is that the person was likely to retire).
It’s not speculative to assume that the person would have worked for another 10 or 15 years, and it’s not hard to calculate what he or she would have earned and what the total losses are.
It’s much more complicated when we represent a younger person. Since the law does not allow “speculative” damages, it’s simply very difficult to predict how far into the future the court will allow us to project.
In this case, the district court judge ruled that Donlin was entitled to receive damages for economic loss for 10 years into the future. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling :
We note that there will often be uncertainty concerning how long the front-pay period should be, and the evidence adduced at trial will rarely point to a singe, certain number of weeks, months , or years. More likely, the evidence will support a range of reasonable front-pay periods. Within this range, the district court should decide which award is most appropriate to make the claimant whole …
We find that the District Court did not abuse it’s discretion when it awarded Donlin front- pay for 10 years.
This means that we now we have a decision with a sound analysis for front -pay involving a relatively young employee from a high level court. It’s a decision that other victims and their lawyers can rely on and it’s a decision that carries considerable weight. It’s very good news.
In an employment case, the employee who has lost a job has a duty to mitigate — which means that she (or he) must make reasonable efforts to minimize her loss of income. The precise language of the statute says
Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.
In other words:
- a person who is claiming damages in an employment case has a duty to look for work
- damages into the future end if an employee gets an equivalent job or better job
In this case, Donlin first got a job in which she earned $14.70 and hour. The problem was that it was a 32 -mile commute. She worked at the job for two years, and then found a job closer to home at which she made $13.00 an an hour.
She would have received $14.67 an hour as a base salary had she been hired at Philips.
- Donlin’s “voluntary transfer” to a lower-paying job was inconsistent with her “duty to mitigate”
- Phillips should not have to make up the difference.
- once you factor the cost of the commute
- the the two jobs were substantially the same.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Donlin:
An employee need not seek employment which involves conditions that are substantially more onerous than [her] previous position…
It is well settled that a claimant has not failed to make a reasonable effort to mitigate damages when she refuses to accept employment that is an unreasonable distance from her residence.
[T]he job at Mission constituted a substantially equivalent opportunity as that available at Romark. Donlin should not be penalized for accepting that opportunity.
Accordingly, the District Court’s finding that Donlin sufficiently mitigated her damages was not clearly erroneous …
Certainly our clients still have a duty to mitigate and make a “reasonable effort” to find comparable work if they intend to claim damages in a lawsuit. This decision does not change that fact.
But this decision certainly delivers great news since it clearly states that a person is not required take a job which places an onerous burden on him (or her) in order the meet that obligation.
On many fronts, this is a hugely helpful case on questions of damages in employment cases. While we deal with these problems every day, it’s certainly not every day that we get federal circuit court case law on these particular issues.
It’s also a wake up to employers to be careful about their hiring practices.
The bottom line is that Donlin worked as a temp at a company for eight months. Because she was discriminated against when the company hired a man instead of her into a permanent position, she is now entitled to all of her past losses plus 10 years of damages into the future. That’s a big win.
About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the foremost employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States. Ms. Simon is the owner of the Simon Law Firm, L.P.A., and Of Counsel to McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman, a Cleveland, Ohio based law firm. She is also the author of the legal blog, the Employee Rights Post. Her website is www.ellensimon.net.
Thursday, April 2nd, 2009
Good luck to anyone who is trying to figure out what is going on with the Gross v. FBL Financial Services case argued in the Supreme Court yesterday. I have been doing this work for three decades and I think it’s almost impossible.
The questions presented are:
- In a “mixed-motive” age discrimination case — where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the employment decision, should the employer be permitted to avoid liability if proves that it would have taken the same action anyway?
- What kind of evidence needs to be presented — direct or circumstantial — to prove a “mixed-motive” case?
- Does the discriminatory reason need to be a “substantial reason” or “a motivating reason” for the employee to prevail?
- Which party bears the burden of proof?
The answers turns on whether the Supreme Court will apply the older mixed motive analysis under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins or the newer standard under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. (“CRA”); or (less likely) whether the Court will overrule Price Waterhouse as requested by the employer-respondent.
In the 1989 Price Waterhouse decision, the plaintiff Ann Hopkins presented direct evidence (as opposed to circumstantial evidence) that she was discriminated against when she was denied a promotion to partnership. The defendant basically said that even though it may have discriminated, it would have reached the same result anyway in denying Ms. Hopkins her promotion.
In it’s fractured decision, the Supreme Court came up with a new way of proving discrimination in what it called a “mixed-motive” case. Simply said, this new method of proof set forth a complicated and confusing burden shifting framework.
After the Price Waterhouse decision, courts began allowing employers who used illegal factors in employment decisions to avoid liability by merely showing that they would have made the same decision anyway even without considering the unlawful factor.
In other words, the unintended consequence of the decision was that employers were getting off the hook in the face of direct evidence of discrimination.
As a result, Congress overturned that portion of Price Waterhouse when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In so doing, it specifically lowered the standards for employees in “mixed-motive” cases. Theoretically, the CRA makes it easier for employees to win these cases. Under the Act:
- the employer is not absolved of liability in “mixed-motive cases” even if it proves it would have made the same decision anyway, but damages to the employee are restricted.
- in order to take advantage of the mixed-motive theory and shift the burden to the defendant, the plaintiff must “demonstrate” that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice
The legislation was silent as to what type of evidence (direct, circumstantial, clear and convincing, etc.) the plaintiff needed to successfully prove the illegal motivation.
The issue of what kind of evidence was required was decided by the Supreme Court inDesert Palace, Inc. v.Costa in 2003. According to that decision, Congress intended the term “demonstrate” to mean that an employee could prove his or her case bydirect or circumstantial evidence. As the Court stated:
Title VII’s silence with respect to the type of evidence required in mixed-motive cases . . . suggests that we should not depart from the “[c]onventional rul[e] of civil litigation [that] generally appl[ies] in Title VII cases.” … That rule requires a plaintiff to prove his case “by a preponderance of the evidence,” . . . by using “direct or circumstantial evidence,” Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,460 U.S. 711, 714, n. 3 (1983).
You would think that would settle it but there’s always a wrinkle, and the wrinkle for Mr. Gross is that the CRA applies to Title VII and does not specifically mention the Age Discrimination in Employment Act . As a result, according to FBL Financial, neither the CRA nor the Desert Palace decision apply to Gross’ case.
Paul Secunda from the Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog points out that conservative justices like Scalia, Thomas, Roberts and Alito may jump on this argument.
One argument, likely to be favored by conservative justices like Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito, is a textualist approach arguing that Congress knew what it was doing, could have expressly included the ADEA in the CRA of 1991, but chose not to for whatever reason. If we are unhappy with the current state of affairs, the argument continues, the proper approach is to allow Congress to amend the CRA of 1991 to include ADEA claims.
The flip side is that disparate treatment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (which is what this is) are always interpreted identically to claims brought under Title VII (which prohibits discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) on issues like the ones before the Court.
Gross’ argument is that there would be no reason not to interpret the ADEA consistently with Title VII and no reason not to do so in this case. That is in fact what many courts have done. (ie the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Blair v. Henry Filters)
If anyone wants more, better, or different analysis of the Gross case, there are lots good pieces on it (SCOTUSBLOG, Ross Runkel’s Law Memo are two)
Whatever the outcome, as a practical matter I don’t think it will change the way employees and their lawyers go about proving age discrimination cases:
- Plaintiffs are going to present all the evidence they have whether it’s direct or circumstantial, or both.
- Most of us who represent employees have never seen the benefit of getting a “mixed motive” instruction even when we have direct evidence of discrimination because it’s too confusing to the jury.
- It’s just a much easier and better standard for employees in discrimination cases to have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that age, race, sex, religion, national origin, or disability was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision.
For sure, the decision will be interesting to Supreme Court observers to see how the justices line up on this one. Other than that, it’s not very interesting at all, but since it’s not often that an age discrimination cases hit the Supreme Court, it’s got to be talked about even though I am the first to admit –it’s mostly academic.
Crossposted from Ellen Simon’s blog Employee Rights Post.
About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the foremost employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States. Ms. Simon is the owner of the Simon Law Firm, L.P.A., and Of Counsel to McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman, a Cleveland, Ohio based law firm. She is also the author of the legal blog, the Employee Rights Post. Her website is www.ellensimon.net.