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Posts Tagged ‘SEC’

Dodd-Frank Court Case Could Redefine Whistleblowing

Monday, December 4th, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court is mulling a case with major implications for would-be whistleblowers. At issue is fuzzy language in the whistleblower protections of the Dodd-Frank Act. At stake is the fate of people like Paul Somers, who was fired after he reported wrongdoing, and anyone who might blow the whistle in the future.

The decision could literally redefine who is a federal whistleblower. The wording in Dodd-Frank – under a strict interpretation – appears to protect only those who report illegal activity directly to the SEC. Had Somers done so, the law would protect him from retaliation. By reporting to his employer instead of the SEC, he may be out of luck.

Blowing the whistle or just whistling Dixie?

The case is Digital Realty Trust v. Somers. Paul Somers, an executive of a real estate investment trust, went up the chain of command with evidence of securities violations. After he was fired, Somers sued for retaliation under the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank. The language in Dodd-Frank defines whistleblower as someone who “provides information relating to a violation of the securities laws” to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Does that mean workers are not protected when  employers take the slash-and-burn approach to prevent the wrongdoing from filtering up to the SEC?

Some justices felt the law is clear, or cannot be interpreted more broadly. Other justices doubted that Congress intended to punish whistleblowers who first went to their employers.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically protects employees who report wrongdoing internally, whether or not they report it to the SEC. The Court’s Dodd-Frank decision could essentially nullify the whistleblower protections of Sarbanes-Oxley. That would kick it back to a Congress that is unlikely to rewrite the law favorably for employees. The Trump administration has been friendly to whistleblowers who report government waste and fraud, but hostile to other forms of whistleblowing.

Could the Supreme Court kill whistleblowing?

If the Court sides with Digital Realty, it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on potential whistleblowers. Even with anti-retaliation protection (and the possibility of a qui tam lawsuit), reporting fraud or abuses is a risky venture. If the Court removes the protections of Dodd-Frank, such heroes are on their own. Many will simply stay silent.

It could also be a Pyrrhic victory for companies accused of wrongdoing. If Dodd-Frank is interpreted narrowly, more whistleblowers will go straight to the SEC, allowing employers no opportunity to mitigate or do the right thing before the feds come down on them.

This blog was originally published at Passman & Kaplan, P.C., Attorneys at Law on December 1, 2017. Reprinted with permission.

About the Authors: Founded in 1990 by Edward H. Passman and Joseph V. Kaplan, Passman & Kaplan, P.C., Attorneys at Law, is focused on protecting the rights of federal employees and promoting workplace fairness.  The attorneys of Passman & Kaplan (Edward H. Passman, Joseph V. Kaplan, Adria S. Zeldin, Andrew J. Perlmutter, Johnathan P. Lloyd and Erik D. Snyder) represent federal employees before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and other federal administrative agencies, and also represent employees in U.S. District and Appeals Courts.

House GOP’s Bill to Eliminate Nearly All Class Actions Would Encourage More Ponzi Schemes & Other Corporate Cheating

Thursday, March 2nd, 2017

There was a lot of national attention when Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme collapsed and it became clear that he had stolen hundreds of millions of dollars from investors around the country. Many thousands of stories were written about how he went to prison, the SEC investigated both the scheme and how the scheme had been able to go on so long, and a number of private lawsuits tried to recover money for investors from various people who enabled his scheme.

But in all of the coverage of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, I never saw a single story that said “this is actually good for the free market; what we really need is for Congress to try to block lawsuits that would let investors recover their money from the crooks and discourage these schemes.”

A couple of years later, enter Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-Corporate Lobbyist Heaven), with his ironically titled “Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act,” which passed through the House Judiciary Committee two weeks ago. Its passage was a remarkable feat of avoiding public notice or debate, with Goodlatte ramming through the legislation in the middle of the night, voting down all amendments along party lines, and refusing to even hold a hearing on the bill, which had at least ten new provisions never included in the previous version passed by the Committee.

Now, the bill is expected to be voted on by the full House next Tuesday.

Goodlatte’s bill was drafted by corporate lobbyists to eliminate the vast majority of class action lawsuits. It would roll back protections for defrauded investors, cheated consumers, people whose privacy has been violated, small businesses harmed by price fixing, workers cheated by wage theft, and pretty much anyone harmed in any way by corporations that break the law.

The legislation has been opposed by nearly every major civil rights organization in America (including Public Justice, the public interest law firm which I head), nearly every major consumer advocate in the nation, the Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (America’s federal judges see the abuse of separation of powers of this ham handed meddling in the ways courts operate), the normally very business-oriented American Bar Association (business lawyers have joined with lawyers for individuals in seeing the mischief here; after all, many small businesses will be harmed by this bill), and numerous academics (their letter are available here, here and here).

Among other things, the lawsuits it would wipe away include cases against Ponzi schemes. While Madoff may have been the biggest corporate criminal in that field, a number of other crooks have cheated American investors in Ponzi schemes, and class action lawsuits have repeatedly successfully recovered investors’ money.

In McGrew v. Harris Bank, for example, a case pursued in Washington State, a successful class action recovered more than $14 million for investors cheated in a Ponzi scheme. Similarly, in Getty v. Philip Steven Harmon, lawyers for investors identified a key person responsible for this scheme who was affiliated with SunAmerican Securities, Inc. – which knew or should have known that securities laws were being violated. The suit recovered more than $5 million for cheated investors. Under Rep. Goodlatte’s bill, these investors almost certainly would have been out of luck. (The legal explanation is set out in painful detail in the letters attached above in this piece.)

Corporate lobbyists might say this pair of successful class actions taking on Ponzi schemes are anecdotes. For people who like data, though, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau did a careful study of 400 class actions against banks and payday lenders. In those cases, the CFPB found that more than 13 million customers received more than $2.7 billion in recoveries. One of the many lies that Congressman Goodlatte likes to say about class actions is that they don’t actually help cheated consumers, and instead just enrich the lawyers. But the CFPB study of the actual results in these class actions against lenders found that the total attorneys fees in the cases amounted to 16% of the gross relief received by the consumers.

It’s hard to tell right now whether this bill has any serious chance of becoming law. A much milder, more competently drafted version of the Bill was opposed by 17 House Republicans in the last Congress, and never moved in the Senate. Presumably every, or nearly every, Senate Democrat and some moderate Republicans will vote against a bill that would (among other things) make it impossible to bring most lawsuits that offer relief when corporations pay female employees less than male ones, or protect the public from defective products. But the emboldened corporate lobbyist class has spent a lot more money to try to move the bill in this Congress.

The best way to ensure this terrible bill gets blocked is if a large number of Americans contact their legislators and urge them to vote to defeat it.

This time around, we can’t count on President Obama’s veto pen. President Trump has not said anything about the bill one way or the other. We can only hope he might feel constrained by his often-repeated promises not to side with corporate lobbyists against regular Americans, and decide not to sign this monstrosity if it does make it to his desk. But we can’t rely on that scenario, either, and need to stop this bill before it makes its way to the White House.

Rep. Goodlatte’s timing is less than ideal, too. He’s trying to eliminate class actions just a couple of months after the revelations that Wells Fargo had cheated two million of its customers by creating false and unauthorized credit card and checking accounts in their names. That news came not long after Volkswagen was caught rigging its pollution control devices not to work (after prominently advertising to consumers how environmentally friendly its cars were), and a short time after hundreds of thousands of American consumers got refunds or had their homes repaired as a result of class actions, following the discovery that defective Chinese dry wall was damaging their homes. It’s an odd time for the House Republican leadership to decide that Americans should not be able to pursue their rights against corporations that break basic consumer protection, employment and securities laws.

Battling big business can be a herculean task in today’s Congress. Yet it is essential that every American understand the direct, and damaging, impact this particular legislation will have on countless consumers.

This bill isn’t about “fairness.” It’s about giving a gift to corporate lobbyists on Capitol Hill.

This blog originally appeared in Huffington Post on March 2, 2017. Reprinted with permission.

Paul Bland, Jr., Executive Director, has been a senior attorney at Public Justice since 1997. As Executive Director, Paul manages and leads a staff of nearly 30 attorneys and other staff, guiding the organization’s litigation docket and other advocacy. Follow him on Twitter: .

Republican takes aim at your right to know how high CEO pay is compared to typical workers

Friday, February 10th, 2017

As of January 1, companies will have to make public how much their CEOs make compared to what their average workers make. They don’t like that rule so much — enacted thanks to Dodd-Frank — and they might be able to get it killed.

On Monday, the acting chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Michael Piwowar, called for reconsideration of the rule that went into effect on January 1, hinting that it could be reversed.

“[I]t is my understanding that some issuers have begun to encounter unanticipated compliance difficulties that may hinder them in meeting the reporting deadline,” he wrote. So he called for a new period of public input over the next 45 days, after which he will direct the SEC staff to “reconsider the implementation of the rule based on any comments submitted and to determine as promptly as possible whether additional guidance or relief may be appropriate.”

Translation: Companies don’t want people to know how much more their CEOs make than the median worker, and rather than admitting that they don’t want people to know that, they’re calling it “unanticipated compliance difficulties.”

This rule isn’t something Republicans can just kill off immediately, but that’s clearly the direction they’re headed. Businesses have a lot to hide, after all. Like how CEOs make 276 times more than typical workers, while the corporate world lobbies against policies that benefit workers, like paid sick leave, paid family leave, or increased minimum wage.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is stocking his cabinet with former CEOs.

This article originally appeared at DailyKOS.com on January 28, 2017. Reprinted with permission.

Laura Clawson is a Daily Kos contributing editor since December 2006. Labor editor since 2011.

SEC Orders Company to Pay $500K For Whistleblower Retaliation

Friday, October 7th, 2016

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This past week, the SEC brought its first enforcement action ever to be based solely on retaliation against a whistleblower.  On September 29, 2016, the SEC ordered International Game Technology (IGT) to pay a $500,000 penalty for terminating the employment of a whistleblower because he reported to senior management and the SEC that the company’s financial statements might be distorted.  Though this is the second time the SEC has exercised its authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to redress whistleblower retaliation, it is the SEC’s first stand-alone retaliation case.  The enforcement action underscores the high value the agency places on whistleblowers and indicates that the SEC Office of the Whistleblower will remain an aggressive advocate for whistleblowers under its new director, Jane Norberg.

Background

The whistleblower joined IGT in 2008.  When IGT terminated his employment on October 30, 2014, the whistleblower was a division director with a budget of more than $700 million and supervisory responsibility for up to eleven direct reports.  Throughout his tenure at IGT, he received exceptional ratings and was described as the VP’s Supervisor’s top employee, as a “high potential” employee, and as an employee with a potential “future assignment” at the vice-president level.  In addition, IGT even sought authorization from senior resources managers to pay him a special retention bonus.

Starting in June 2014, the whistleblower led several projects to determine whether it was cheaper for IGT to refurbish used parts using outside vendors or through internal refurbishment.  During the project, the whistleblower became concerned that IGT was improperly accounting for costs associated with refurbished used parts.  Although the whistleblower was not an accountant in the company, he reasonably believed that the company’s current method resulted in a $10 million discrepancy in the financial statements.

On July 30, 2014, the whistleblower reported his findings to his supervisors during a presentation.  After raising concerns about the accounting method and its impact on the financial statements, the whistleblower had a heated disagreement with the executive supervisor on the issue.  Immediately following the meeting, the executive supervisor emailed the whistleblower’s supervisor regarding the presentations, stating that, “I can’t allow [the whistleblower] to place those inflammatory statements into presentations, if there is not basis in fact.”

Thereafter, IGT conducted an internal investigation into the allegations made by the whistleblower.  During the investigation, IGT retaliated against the whistleblower by removing him from job opportunities that were significant to performing his job successfully.  On October 31, 2016, the internal investigation concluded that IGT’s cost accounting model was appropriate and did not cause its financial statements to be distorted.  That same day, IGT terminated the whistleblower.

SOX’s Reasonable Belief Standard Provides Broad Protection

Although the whistleblower’s concern was ultimately incorrect, he was still protected under the SEC Whistleblower Program because he reasonably believed that IGT’s cost accounting model constituted a violation of federal securities laws.  Recently, the trend in federal courts has been to broadly construe protected activity under this reasonable belief standard.  This is a departure from the previous requirement that whistleblowers “definitively and specifically” identify the alleged violation at issue, which undermined potential whistleblowing.

The courts’ broad interpretation of the reasonable belief standard is important because whistleblowers’ must be free to make good faith disclosures, even if they end up being wrong.  As Andrew J. Ceresney, director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, said, “[s]trong enforcement of the anti-retaliation protections is critical to the success of the SEC’s whistleblower program.  This [IGT] whistleblower noticed something that he felt might lead to inaccurate financial reporting and law violations, and he was wrongfully targeted for doing the right thing and reporting it.”

Similarly, Jane A. Norberg, Chief of the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower, stated that “[b]ringing retaliation cases, including this first stand-alone retaliation case, illustrates the high priority we place on ensuring a safe environment for whistleblowers.  We will continue to exercise our anti-retaliation authority when companies take reprisals for whistleblowing efforts.”

Prior SEC Enforcement Action for Whistleblower Retaliation

The IGT enforcement action is consistent with an SEC enforcement action against hedge fund advisory firm Paradigm Capital Management (“Paradigm”), which also redressed whistleblower retaliation.  On June 16, 2014, the SEC announced that it was taking enforcement action against Paradigm for engaging in prohibited principal transactions and for retaliating against the whistleblower who disclosed the unlawful trading activity to the SEC.

According to the order, Paradigm retaliated against its head trader for disclosing, internally and to the SEC, prohibited principal transactions with an affiliated broker-dealer while trading on behalf of a hedge fund client. The transactions were a tax-avoidance strategy under which realized losses were used to offset the hedge fund’s realized gains.

When Paradigm learned that the head trader had disclosed the unlawful principal transactions to the SEC, it retaliated against him by removing him from his position as head trader, changing his job duties, placing him on administrative leave, and permitting him to return from administrative leave only in a compliance capacity, not as head trader. The whistleblower ultimately resigned his position.

Paradigm settled the SEC charges by consenting to the entry of an order finding that it violated the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank and committed other securities law violations, agreeing to pay more than $1 million to shareholders and to hire a compliance consultant to overhaul their internal procedures, and entering into a cease-and-desist order.

The SEC’s press release accompanying the order includes the following statement by Enforcement Director Ceresney: “Those who might consider punishing whistleblowers should realize that such retaliation, in any form, is unacceptable.” The Paradigm enforcement action suggests that whistleblower retaliation can result in liability far beyond the damages that a whistleblower can obtain in a retaliation action and that retaliation can invite or heighten SEC scrutiny.

These enforcement actions signal to companies that retaliating against a whistleblower can result not only in a private suit brought by the whistleblower, but also in a unilateral SEC enforcement action.  The IGT action in particular indicates that employers cannot take adverse actions against whistleblowers, even when the underlying disclosure is in error.

For more information about whistleblower protections and whistleblower rewards, call the whistleblower lawyers at Zuckerman Law at 202-262-8959.

This blog originally appeared at ZuckermanLaw.com on October 4, 2016. Reprinted with permission.

Jason Zuckerman, Principal of Zuckerman Law, litigates whistleblower retaliation, qui tam, wrongful discharge, discrimination, non-compete, and other employment-related claims. He is rated 10 out of 10 by Avvo, was recognized by Washingtonian magazine as a “Top Whistleblower Lawyer” in 2007 and 2009 and selected by his peers to be included in The Best Lawyers in America® and in SuperLawyers.

SEC Issues Rule on CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio Disclosures

Thursday, September 26th, 2013

secunda-paulLast week, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released a rule requiring companies to disclose the CEO-to-worker pay ratio.  Despite objections by many corporations, the rule covers all employees including seasonal, international, and part-time workers.  The SEC provides companies the option of using the entire workforce or a representative sample in the calculation.

There will now be a 60-day comment period.  The SEC voted for the rule 3-2, with the two Republican Commissioners who voted against the proposal calling it a special interest provision and proclaiming “shame on the SEC.”

Proponents of the rule argue that it will give shareholders and other stakeholders a clear line of sight into human capital management and worker pay.  For instance, CalPERS, the California State Pension Plan, has issued a release, welcoming the rule as a valuable tool which will “help shareholders to keep management accountable” and “shed light on an element of pay which is currently shrouded from view.”  John Liu, the NYC Comptroller, stated that the rule would allow “shareowners to make informed decisions about compensation and may rein in excessive corporate practices.”

Numerous news outlets have covered this story, including the Wall Street JournalBloomberg, and the New York Times.  Things are only going to get more interesting from here on out.

From my point of view, and quoting Justice Brandeis, “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”

This article was originally printed on Workplace Prog Blog on September 23, 2013.  Reprinted with permission.

About the Author: Paul Secunda is an associate professor of  law at Marquette University Law School.  Professor Secunda is the author of nearly three dozen books, treatises, articles, and shorter writings. He co-authored the treatise Understanding Employment Law and the case book Global Issues in Employee Benefits Law.  Professor Secunda is a frequent commentator on labor and employment law issues in the national media.  He co-edits with Rick Bales and Jeffrey Hirsch the Workplace Prof Blog, recently named one of the top law professor blogs in the country.

Dodd-Frank Bill Provides Robust Whistleblower Protections

Friday, July 16th, 2010

jason zuckermanRecognizing that robust whistleblower protection is critical to preventing another financial crisis, Congress included in the Dodd-Frank financial services reform bill (H.R. 4173) numerous provisions designed to encourage whistleblowing and to provide robust protection from retaliation.  These provisions create monetary awards for whistleblowers who provide original information to the SEC or CFTC, strengthen the whistleblower protection provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the False Claims Act, and create additional whistleblower retaliation causes of action.

Reward for Whistleblowing to the SEC and Prohibition Against Retaliation (Section 922). Under Section 922, the SEC will be required to pay a reward to individuals who provide original information to the SEC which results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million.  The award will range from 10 to 30 percent of the amount recouped and the amount of the award shall be at the discretion of the SEC.   Factors to be considered in determining the amount of the award include the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower, the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower, the programmatic interest of the SEC in deterring violations of the securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers, and other factors that the SEC may establish by rule or regulation.  If the amount awarded is less than 10 percent or more than 30 percent of the amount recouped, a whistleblower may appeal the SEC’s determination by filing an appeal in the appropriate federal court of appeals within 30 days of the determination.

Section 922 prohibits the SEC from providing an award to a whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower provided information; who gains the information by auditing financial statements as required under the securities laws; who fails to submit information to the SEC as required by an SEC rule; or who is an employee of the DOJ or an appropriate regulatory agency, an SRO, the PCAOB or a law enforcement organization.

Section 922 creates a new private right of action for employees who have suffered retaliation “because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower– ‘(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with [the whistleblower incentive section]; (ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such information; or (iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,’” the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and “‘any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].’”  The action may be brought in federal court and remedies include reinstatement, double back pay with interest, as well as litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees.

New Whistleblower Protection for Financial Services Employees (Section 1057). Section 1057 creates a robust private right of action for employees in the financial services industry who suffer retaliation for disclosing information about fraudulent or unlawful conduct related to the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service.  The scope of coverage is quite broad in that Section 1057 applies to organizations that extend credit or service or broker loans; provide real estate settlement services or perform property appraisals; provide financial advisory services to consumers relating to proprietary financial products, including credit counseling; or collect, analyze, maintain, or provide consumer report information or other account information in connection with any decision regarding the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service.

Section 1057 prohibits retaliation against an employee who has engaged in any of the following protected acts:

• Provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide or cause to be provided, to an employer, the newly created Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau), or any other government authority or law enforcement agency, information that the employee reasonably believes relates to any violation of any provision of Title X of the bill, which establishes new consumer financial protections, or any rule, order, standard or prohibition prescribed or enforced by the Bureau;

• Testified or will testify in a proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement of any provision of Title X;

• Filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under any federal consumer financial law; or

• Objected to, or refused to participate in any activity, practice, or assigned task that the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of any law, rule, standard, or prohibition subject to the jurisdiction of, or enforceable, by the Bureau.

Remedies include reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees and litigation costs, including expert witness fees.  Where reinstatement is unavailable or impractical, front pay may be awarded.

Section 1057 employs a burden-shifting framework that is favorable to employees.  A complainant can prevail merely by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that her protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action. A contributing factor is any factor which, alone or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision.  Once a complainant meets her burden by a preponderance of the evidence, the employer can avoid liability only if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the employee’s protected conduct.

The procedures governing Section 1057 claims are substantially similar to those governing retaliation claims brought under the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 15 U.S.C. § 2087.  The statute of limitations is 180 days and the claim must be filed initially with the Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA), which will investigate the complaint and can order preliminary reinstatement.  Once OSHA issues its findings, either party can request a hearing before a Department of Labor (DOL) administrative law judge.  If the DOL has not issued a final order within 210 days of the filing of the complaint, the complainant has the option to remove the claim to federal court and either party can request a trial by jury.  Section 1057 claims are exempt from mandatory arbitration agreements.

Reward for Whistleblowing to the CFTC (Section 748). Section 748 amends the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., to create a whistleblower incentive program and whistleblower protections similar to those in section 922, including a new private right of action.  One notable difference between sections 748 and 922 is the ability of a commodity whistleblower to appeal any determination regarding an award made by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) within 30 days.  Protected conduct under section 748 includes providing information to the CFTC in accordance with the whistleblower incentive provision and “assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action of the [CFTC] based upon or related to such information.”

Strengthening Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Protection Provision (Sections 922 and 922A). Sections 922 and 929A contain important amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) that broaden the scope of coverage, increase the statute of limitations, exempt SOX whistleblower claims from mandatory arbitration, and clarify that SOX claims removed to federal court can be tried before a jury.

Section 929A clarifies that the whistleblower protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, applies to employees of subsidiaries of publicly-traded companies “whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of [a publicly] traded company.”  This amendment eliminates a significant loophole that some courts have read into SOX that has substantially narrowed the scope of SOX coverage.  Elevating form over substance, some judges have permitted publicly-traded companies to avoid liability under SOX merely because the parent company that files reports with the SEC has few, if any, direct employees, and instead employs most of its workforce through non-publicly traded subsidiaries.

As Judge Levin pointed in Morefield v. Exelon Servs., Inc., ALJ No. 2004-SOX-002 (ALJ Jan. 28, 2004), this loophole is contrary to the purpose of SOX in that “[a] publicly traded corporation is, for Sarbanes-Oxley purposes, the sum of its constituent units; and Congress insisted upon accuracy and integrity in financial reporting at all levels of the corporate structure, including the non-publicly traded subsidiaries . . . [Congress] imposed reforms upon the publicly traded company, and through it, to its entire corporate organization.”  Section 922(b) further expands the coverage of section 806 of SOX to include employees of nationally recognized statistical ratings organizations (NRSROs), including A.M. Best Company, Inc., Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Service.

Section 922(c) increases the statute of limitations for SOX whistleblower claims from 90 to 180 days and clarifies that SOX retaliation plaintiffs can elect to try their cases in federal court before a jury.  In addition, section 922(c) declares void any “agreement, policy form, or condition of employment, including a predispute arbitration agreement” which waives the rights and remedies afforded to SOX whistleblowers.

Strengthening the False Claims Act’s Whistleblower Protection Provision (Section 1079B). Section 1079B amends the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), by expanding the definition of protected conduct to include “lawful acts done by the employee, contractor, or agent or associated others in furtherance of an action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of [the False Claims Act],” thereby protecting against associational discrimination and covering a broad range of activities that could further a potential qui tam action or could stop a violation of the FCA.  Section 1079B clarifies that the statute of limitations for actions brought under section 3730(h) is three years, which brings much-needed clarity in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409 (2005) holding that the most closely analogous state statute of limitations applies to FCA retaliation claims.

“This article was originally posted on http://employmentlawgroupblog.com/”

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