Outten & Golden: Empowering Employees in the Workplace

Posts Tagged ‘Ellen Simon’

Employee Rights Short Takes: Wage Discrimination, Race Discrimination, Sexual Harassment and More

Tuesday, May 18th, 2010

Here are a few Short Takes worth sharing:

Sex Discrimination

Ninth Circuit Certifies Wal-Mart Class Action: In Dukes v. Wal-Mart, a decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 26th, the Court certified a class in a Title VII lawsuit involving 1.5 million women seeking compensation for back pay. The Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination regarding punitive damages based upon several factors set forth in the decision. The next step is most likely a request for the Supreme Court to hear the case. For more about the case, see the California Punitive Damages Blog. For an interesting story about Betty Dukes, the Wal-Mart greeter and lead plaintiff  see the article here from the Huffington Post. This case is reported to be the largest class action in history.

Sexual Harassment

EEOC Collects $471,000 In Sex Harassment Case: The EEOC reported last week that Everdry Marketing and Management paid $471,096 in damages, plus $86,581 in post-judgment interest to 13 victims of sexual harassment. The payout stems from a four week jury trial in Rochester, New York and a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the award in favor of the plaintiffs. The case involved a prolonged period of physical and verbal sexual harassment of mostly teenage telemarketers by male managers and co-workers at Everdry’s Rochester, N.Y. location including demands for sex, groping, sexual jokes and constant comments about the bodies of women employees. The story presents another example of the widespread problem of teenage sexual harassment in the U.S

Has The Sixth Circuit Had An Attitude Adjustment?

Two cases last month out of the Sixth Circuit  Court of Appeals made me think that attitudes on employment discrimination cases may be shifting.

Summary Judgment Reversed In Race Discrimination Case: In Thompson v UHHSS Richmond Heights Hospital, Inc, the plaintiff was terminated from her position as a food production supervisor when she was told that her position was eliminated in a restructuring. Thompson believed  that she was selected for termination because of her race and filed a lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment against her. The Sixth Circuit reversed finding that evidence of Thompson’s superior qualifications in comparison to the employee who assumed most of her job duties showed that she was replaced and also showed pretext. In addition, evidence that a supervisor said to “get rid of” certain black employees whom he called “troublemakers,” which the district court gave “little weight,” corroborated accusations of discriminatory behavior according to the Court.

Sexual Harassment Verdict Affirmed On Appeal: In West v. Tyson Foods,Inc. the Court affirmed a sexual harassment award including $750,000 for past and future mental distress, and $300,000 in punitive damages. In addition to great language on damages, the Court also addressed the sufficiency of reporting sexual harassment to one supervisor as constituting “notice” and a “missing evidence” jury instruction from which the jury is entitled to draw a negative inference. The plaintiff, an assembly line worker, was subjected to a barrage of verbal and physical harassment – 10 to 15 times per shift — during her five weeks of employment at the Tyson Foods plant in Robards, Kentucky. The jury awarded more in damages that West’s lawyer requested which the Sixth Circuit both addressed and confirmed.

images: www.hickmankytourism.com

www.reclaimdemocracy.org

*This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on May 12, 2010. Reprinted with permission.

About the Author: Ellen Simon: is recognized as one of the leading  employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States.She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.

Age Discrimination Gets Attention Of Congress

Friday, May 14th, 2010

Hearings Held On Federal Discrimination Bill To Overturn Gross Decision

Last week, both the House and Senate held hearings on the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act (POWADA) (H.R. 3721, S. 1756). The legislation would overturn the awful Gross v. FBL Financials Services, Inc. case decided by the Supreme Court last year. If passed,  the bill will apply retroactively to all cases pending on or after June 17, 2009, the date of the Gross decision.

Simply stated, the Gross decision holds age discrimination plaintiffs to a higher standard of proof than other victims of discrimination by requiring them to prove that their age was the “but for” cause of the employer’s adverse decision instead of  “a motivating factor.” I predicted, as did others, that Gross would get a Congressional fix and that’s exactly what POWADA does – and more.

For one, POWADA allows the plaintiff to win an age discrimination case by proving that:

(A) an impermissible factor under the Act (the discrimination statute) was a motivating factor for the practice complained of  — even if other factors also motivated the practice, or

(B) the practice complained of would not have occurred in the absence of an impermissible factor.

The legislation also establishes that:

  • standards of proof for all federal laws forbidding discrimination and retaliation (including whistleblowing) are the same
  • the plaintiff can choose the method of proof for the case, including the McDonnell Douglas framework
  • employees can rely on any type or form of admissible circumstantial or direct evidence to prove their discrimination and retaliation cases

The Act explicitly states that the standard for proving unlawful disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and other anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws is no different than the standard of proof under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

In other words, all plaintiffs in discrimination cases will be held to the same standards of proof and will be able to prove their discrimination cases in the same way. While this is most certainly what Congress intended in the first place, it will be very beneficial for all of us who litigate these cases — and our clients — to have these evidentiary matters settled once and for all.

image: www.conversantlife.com/files/imagecache/blog_wizard/files/blog_wizard/proof.png

*This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on May 9, 2010. Reprinted with permission.

About the Author: Ellen Simon: is recognized as one of the leading  employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States.She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.

Truck Driver Wins Gender Discrimination Case In Fourth Circuit

Thursday, April 29th, 2010

Court Elaborates On Types Of  Evidence For Proof Of  Discrimination

The recent case of Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight is hands down one of the best decisions I have come across in a long time.

It addresses gender discrimination, sex stereotyping, and a corporate culture of discrimination in a way few cases have. It’s simply a great case for employees – particularly for victims of sex discrimination.

What Happened In The Case

Merritt worked as a line haul truck drive for Old Dominion, a nationwide trucking company. As a line haul driver, Merritt made lengthy cross-country trips. She performed her duties without incident or complaint. At some point, Merritt became interested in becoming a pickup and delivery driver so she could work more regular hours and spend  nights and weekends at home.

To prove that she could do the job, she filled in numerous times as a pickup and delivery driver, and once again performed the duties without incident or complaint.

When a permanent pickup and delivery position became available at Old Dominion’s Lynchburg Virginia terminal, Merritt talked to Bobby Howard, the terminal manager about it. Howard told her that he lacked the authority to fill the position and proceeded to hire a less experienced man for the job.

The following year another permanent pickup and delivery position became available in Lynchburg and Merritt again expressed an interest in the position to Howard. Once again, Merritt was passed over in favor of a less experienced male.

When Merritt asked why she was not hired, Howard told her that :

  • it was decided and they could not let a woman have that position.
  • the company did not really have women drivers in the city (as pick up and deliver drivers)

On another occasion he told her:

  • the Regional VP was worried about hiring a female pickup and deliver driver because women were more injury prone and he was aftaid a female would get hurt
  • the VP didn’t think a girl should have that position

Finally, a year later, Old Dominion hired Merritt to fill a permanent Pickup and Delivery position in Lynchburg. Merritt was placed on a ninety-day probationary and told she could lose her job if any performance problems arose. Male drivers were not subject to similar probationary terms.

For the next two years, Merritt performed her Pickup and Delivery duties without a problem. Unfortunately, she then suffered an ankle injury at work which was diagnosed as plantar fascititis with a superimposed strain. She was put on light duty work by her doctor at first, but a couple of months later, he gave her a clean bill of health.

When she attempted to return to her regular duties, Brian Stoddard, Vice President of Safety and Personnel, required Merritt to take a physical ability test (“PAT”), a full-body test divided into six components that evaluates the test taker’s general strength, agility, and cardiovascular endurance. The test was graded on a pass/fail basis. The PAT was created for Old Dominion to be used in the hiring process and had been used to evaluate potential hires, but only on a variable basis.

Merritt struggled with several segments of the test and received a failing grade. According to Merritt, the tasks she had problems with had nothing to do with her ankle. In one portion of the test, for example, Merritt was unable to place a box of weight on an overhead shelf simply because she was too short.

After receiving the results of Merritt’s PAT, Stoddard terminated Merritt’s employment. Merritt filed a charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC and then filed a lawsuit in federal court in Western District of Virginia claiming that Old Dominion terminated her because of her gender in violation of Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The district court granted judgment against Merritt because it found that Old Dominion produced a legitimate reason for firing Merritt (she failed the PAT) and because she had not produced any evidence that Stoddard (the decision maker) harbored any “discriminatory animus” towards Merritt. Merritt appealed.

The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Reverses

Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against an individual on the basis of sex. The most prevalent  method of establishing discrimination is under the burden-shifting framework set forth in the Supreme Court case of McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green which goes like this:

  • The plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination
  • The burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for its allegedly discriminatory action
  • If the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the neutral reason offered by the employer was not a true reason but a pretext for discrimination.

Ultimately, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she was a victim of intentional discrimination.

In this case, Old Dominion put forth its legitimate non discriminatory justification for discharging Merritt – her failure to pass the PAT.  That proved, according to Old Dominion, that Merritt did not have the “requisite physical strength to safely perform the job duties.” Merritt insisted that this rationale was a pretext for discrimination.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Merritt and found that the “record as a whole supports Merritt’s claim that a jury could find that discrimination on the basis of gender was afoot.”

According to the Court, Merritt produced plenty of  evidence that Old Dominion’s explanation for her discharge was “unworthy of credence.” For example, Merritt’s doctor stated that there was nothing about Merritt’s medical condition which would have prevented her from performing her job duties as a Pickup and Delivery driver. As the Court pointed out:

Old Dominion terminated a good employee who, pre-injury, performed her job ably and without complaint and who, post-injury was both willing and able to report to this same job for work. These facts, if believed, would allow a jury to think Old Dominion was simply looking for a reason to get rid of Merritt.

In addition, the Court found that Merritt produced evidence of discriminatory intent. For one:

  • Injured male employees did not have to take the PAT test
  • Merritt produced evidence that the policy requiring all injured employees to take the PAT test did not exist

As the Court stated:

While a neutral policy serving Old Dominion’s legitimate business interests in public and employee safety could certainly be put in place, a trier of fact could reasonably find that Old Dominion’s selective application and ever-changing rationales for the PAT were designed to conceal intent to reserve the plum Pickup and Delivery positions for male drivers.

In addition, the district court ignored evidence of the corporate culture of discrimination produced by Merritt. The Court stated:

It is not unfair to observe that the corporate culture evinced a very specific yet pervasive aversion to the idea of a female Pickup and Delivery Drivers. Old Dominion employees, of all ranks, seemed to share a view that women were unfit for that position. …..

While the views of others are no proof of the views of Stoddard, at some point the corporate environment in which he worked places Stoddard’s own selective use of the PAT in Merritt’s case in a less neutral context.

In Lattieri v. Equant, ….[w]e deemed the plaintiff’s ‘powerful evidence showing a discriminatory attitude at her company of employment toward female managers’ sufficient to ‘allow a trier of fact to conclude that these discriminatory attitudes led to plaintiff’s ultimate termination.’ Likewise here.

The sum, the Court said:

Old Dominion fired an employee who was, according to the district court, able to do her job without assistance and in a satisfactory manner’ due to a treatable ankle injury, while hiding behind the results of a selectively administered physical fitness test that test that did not even purport to test the injury, and while dubiously claiming that its decision was compelled by a late-blooming policy, all in the context of, to put it mildly, a sexually stereotype work environment.

In this case, it not any single piece of evidence but rather the evidence taken in its entirety that leads us to believe Merritt deserves a trial….

Based on all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Old Dominion and remand for trial on Merritt’s Title VII claim.

Take Away

This case helps women in circumstances similar to Merritt’s – firefighters, police officers, constructions workers, etc. — those in male dominated physical professions who still face widespread discrimination because they are simply not wanted.

Just this past fall, I counseled a female firefighter who was repeatedly seeking a promotion, and forced to take numerous tests that were not required of her male counterparts. It’s not an unusual scenario though this type of discrimination is precisely what Title VII is aimed to prevent. The Merritt case, no doubt, should help women fight for equality in the workplace.

In a broad sense, this case hits so many of the issues that come up in discrimination cases all of the time – “stray remarks,” “post- hoc justifications,” “shifting explanations,” the parsing of evidence by district court judges — to name a few, and frames them in a way that will be extremely helpful to employees and their lawyers in discrimination litigation in the future.

images: rlv.zcache.com

This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on April 28, 2010. Reprinted with permission.

About the Author: Ellen Simon: is recognized as one of the leading  employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States.She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.

It's Equal Pay Day And Time To Pass The Paycheck Fairness Act

Wednesday, April 21st, 2010

Wage Discrimination Needs Attention And A Legislative Fix

April 20, 2010 is Equal Pay Day. It was established in 1996 to illuminate the gap between men’s and women’s wages. The date symbolizes how far into 2010 women must work to earn what men earned in 2009.

This year, with the support of President Obama, Equal Pay Day should also bring attention to pending legislation intended to address lingering issues of pay disparity in the American workforce.

Here are some facts about pay equity from the National Organization for Women:

  • In 2007, women’s median annual paychecks reflected only 78 cents for every $1.00 earned by men. Specifically for women of color, the gap is even wider: In comparison to a man’s dollar, African American women earn only 69 cents and Latinas just 59 cents. 
  • In 1963, when the Equal Pay Act was passed, full-time working women were paid 59 cents on average for every dollar paid to men. This means it took 44 years for the wage gap to close just 19 cents — a rate of less than half a penny a year.
  • The narrowing of this gap has slowed down over the last six years, with women gaining a mere two cents since 2001.
  • Women’s median pay was less than men’s in each and every one of the 20 industries and 25 occupation groups surveyed by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2007. Even men working in female-dominated occupations earn more than women working in those same occupations.
  • According to the Institute for Women’s Policy Research,  if equal pay for women were instituted immediately, across the board, it would result in an annual $319 billion gain nationally for women and their families (in 2008 dollars).
  • When The WAGE Project looked exclusively at full-time workers, they estimated that women with a high school diploma lose as much as $700,000 over a lifetime of work, women with a college degree lose $1.2 million and professional school graduates may lose up to $2 million because of pay disparity.
  • As a result, these inequities follow women into their retirement years, reducing their Social Security benefits, pensions, savings and other financial resources.
  • A study by the American Association of University Women examined how the wage gap affects college graduates. Wage disparities kick in shortly after college graduation, when women and men should, absent discrimination, be on a level playing field.
  • One year after graduating college, women are paid on average only 80 percent of their male counterparts’ wages, and during the next 10 years, women’s wages fall even further behind, dropping to only 69 percent of men’s earnings ten years after college

I have represented women in discrimination cases for many years.  From my vantage point it’s clear that while the pay equity issues are not as blatant as they once were, wage discrimination is still a prevalent concern for women of all socio-economic groups.

It’s also true that the Equal Pay Act of 1963, while well intentioned, has not come close to fulfilling its goal due to a whole host of reasons.

The good news is that there is a bill pending in Congress aimed at correcting unlawful wage disparities and which offers a legislative fix for some of the problems with the Equal Pay Act.

The Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R.12 and S.182) was introduced January 2009 by then-Senator Hillary Clinton and Rep. Rosa DeLauro to strengthen the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The bill expands damages under the Equal Pay Act and amends its very broad fourth affirmative defense which will be a real help to victims of pay discrimination.

The Paycheck Fairness Act also prohibits retaliation against inquiring about or disclosing wage information  and proposes voluntary EEOC guidelines to show employers how to evaluate jobs with the goal of eliminating unfair disparities. The bill was passed by the House in January of 2009 and is pending in the Senate. It’s lead sponsor is Sen. Christopher Dodd.

There were hearings about the bill in March of this year with lots of illuminating testimony, including the remarks of Stuart Ishimaru, acting Chariman of the EEOC, which you can read here if you are interested in more detail about the subject.

The bottom line is if you care about equal rights for women and want to make a difference, please call or write your Senator and urge passage of the Paycheck Fairness Act. Here’s a link that will help you send the message. We know that the President  supports it — we just need to get it on his desk.

images: www.evetahmincioglu.com

*This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on April 20, 2010. Reprinted with permission from the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon: is recognized as one of the leading  employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States.She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.

Employee Has Privacy Interest In E-Mail Communications To Attorney On Company Computer

Thursday, April 15th, 2010

Employee’s E-Mails To Lawyer On Company Laptop Are Off Limits

The decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency has a lot  of lawyers talking. The case has to do with the privacy interests of an employee’s personal e-mail on a company computer and the attorney-client privilege.

The reason the case made ripples through the employment law community is because there simply aren’t many decisions on the issue and it hits a topic of real practical concern for both employers and employees.

What Happened In The Case

Marina Stengart worked for Loving Care Agency, Inc. (“Loving Care”), a home health care agency, as an Executive Director of Nursing.  Like many employers, Loving Care provided Stengart a laptop computer for company business. Stengart could send e-mails using her company e-mail account from the laptop and she could also access the Internet through Loving Care’s server.

In December of 2007, Stengart used her computer to access a personal, password-protected e-mail account on Yahoo’s website to communicate with an attorney about her situation at work. She never saved her Yahoo ID or password on the company laptop.

When she sent the personal e-mails Stengart didn’t know  that Loving Care’s browser software automatically saved a copy of each web page she viewed on the computer’s hard drive in a “cache” folder of temporary Internet files.

Stengart left Loving Care and returned the laptop computer.  A couple of months later, she filed a lawsuit with claims of discrimination, harassment and retaliation.

After the lawsuit was filed, Loving Care hired experts to create a forensic image of the laptop’s hard drive. Among the items retrieved were the e-mails Stengart exchanged with her lawyer via the personal Yahoo account.

Loving Care’s lawyers used the e-mails in the lawsuit. Stengart’s lawyers demanded that the e-mails be identified and returned. Loving Care’s Lawyers argued that Stengart had no expectation of privacy in light of the company’s electronic communications policy which stated in part:

  • Loving Care may review, access, and disclose all matters on the company’s media systems and services at any time
  • e-mails, Internet communications and computer files are the company’s business records and are not to be considered private or personal to any individual employee
  • occasional personal use of the computer is permitted

Stengart’s lawyers asked the trial court to order a return of the e-mails and disqualification of  Loving Care’s lawyers. The judge denied the request, concluding that Stengart waived the attorney client privilege by sending e-mails on the company computer.

Stenagart appealed.The Court of Appeals reversed.

It  found that Stengart had an expectation of privacy in the e-mails and that Loving Care’s lawyers violated the disciplinary rules by failing to alert Stengart’s lawyers that they had the e-mails before they read them.

It sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether disqualification of the firm, or some other sanction was appropriate. Loving Care appealed

The New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion

The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with Stengart and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. In a long and thoughtful opinion, it framed the issue this way:

This case presents novel questions about the extent to which an employee can expect privacy and confidentiality  in personal e-mails with her attorney, which she accessed on a computer belonging to her employer.

Loving Care argued that its employees have no expectation of privacy in their use of company computers based on the company’s policy. It also contended that attorney client privilege either never attached or was waived.

Stengart argued that:

  1. she intended the e-mails with her lawyer to be confidential
  2. the company policy, even if it applied to her, failed to provide adequate warning that Loving Care would monitor the contents of e-mail sent from a personal account or save them on a hard drive
  3. when the lawyers encountered the e-mails, they should have been immediately returned

The Court found favor of Stengart.  In sum, this is what it held:

  • Under the circumstances, Stengart could reasonably expect that the e-mail communications with her lawyer through her personal, password protected, web-based e-mail account would remain private
  • Sending and receiving e-mails through the company laptop did not eliminate the attorney-client privilege that protected them
  • By using a personal e-mail account and not saving the password, Stengart had a subjective expectation of privacy
  • Her expectation of privacy was also objectively reasonable in light of the ambiguous language of the policy and the attorney-client nature of the communication
  • Stengart took reasonable steps to keep the messages confidential and did not know that Loving Care cold read communications sent on her Yahoo account

Regarding the company policy the Court wrote:

The Policy did not give Stengart, or a reasonable person in her position, cause to anticipate that Loving Care would be peering over her shoulder as she opened e-mails from her lawyer on her personal, password-protected Yahoo account.

None of this means that companies are prohibited from monitoring the use of workplace computers. As the Court stated:

Our conclusion that Stengart had an expectation of privacy in e-mails with her lawyer does not mean that employers cannot monitor or regulate the use of workplace computers.

Companies can adopt and enforce lawful policies relating to computer use to protect the assets, reputation, and productivity of a business and to ensure compliance with legitimate corporate policies…..

But employers have no need or basis to read the specific contents of personal, privileged, attorney-client communications in order to enforce corporate policy.

The Court also found that the defense lawyers should have promptly notified Stengart’s lawyers when they discovered the nature of the e-mails. It sent the case back to the trial court judge to determine whether the firm should be disqualified, costs should be imposed, or whether some other remedy was appropriate.

Take Away

I represent employees, and many communicate with me by e-mail. I am always concerned that somehow these e-mails are going to be read by their employers – so this case is very good news because it clearly states that these communications are privileged and protected.

Management lawyers who get these e-mails are prohibited from reading them, must return them, and can be disqualified or sanctioned if they don’t.

Having said that, employees should still be extremely careful if they don’t want their personal e-mails read by their employers —  which means that the best practice is not to use the company computer for personal e-mails or surfing the net.

As far as employers go,  you can bet (and others agree) that many are reviewing their policies and trying to figure out  and address the implications of this decision.

The bottom line is that employers do not have carte blanche to read employees’ private, confidential personal e-mails and even a very good corporate policy is not going to change that fact –at least  for now.

image: www.afcea.org

This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on April 13, 2010. Reprinted with permission from the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon: is recognized as one of the leading  employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States.She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.

It's Nothing New: Male Dominated Professions Foster Culture Of Sex Discrimination

Tuesday, April 6th, 2010

Bankers and Police Officers Charged With Gender Discrimination, Sexual Harassment and Retaliation

Two vastly different professions – banking and law enforcement – yet they share something in common and that is a culture of gender discrimination.

It’s the same stuff that’s been going on for decades in spite of federal laws which make sex discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, and sexual harassment illegal in the workplace. I have heard similar complaints from women for close to 30 years. That’s one of the reasons why I think it’s important to to spread the word about some courageous women  who are out there fighting for their rights.

Here are some of the cases that made the news.

Citigoup and Goldman Sachs Accused Of Discrimination Against Mothers

Two women filed gender discrimination cases against Wall Street banks claiming they were discriminated against after taking time off to have children.

According to ABC news, Charlotte Hanna, a former Golden Sachs VP in the HR department claimed that she was demoted and moved from her private office into a cubicle after the birth of her first child.

She was then fired while she was on maternity leave with her second child. Hanna was told that her position was eliminated, but leaned that another employee was hired to take over her duties.

Dorly Hazan-Amir complained about a long standing “boys club” culture at Citigroup’s asset finance division since the beginning of her employment. When she got pregnant, things got worse.

One manager asked whether she planned to be a “career mom” or “mom mom.” Another told her if she planned to continue working, she would have to put her career first and family second. Her pregnancy became the butt of office jokes.

Wall Street has had an ongoing problem with sex discrimination. Morgan Stanley settled two class action lawsuits brought by thousands of employees for more than $100 million dollars in 2004 and 2007. Smith Barney paid out $33 million in settlement of a case two years ago.

Syracuse Police Officer Gets $400,000 Jury Award

Last month, a New York jury found in favor of Officer Katherine Lee on her claim of sex discrimination and retaliation against the Syracuse police department. It was the third significant verdict against the police department for discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation of female officers in the last ten months.

Sgt. Therese Lore was awarded $500,000 by a jury in May, and Officer Sonia Dotson was awarded $450,000 last month.

Lee, a police officer for 14 years claimed she was repeatedly subjected to sexual harassment, and denied equal pay and promotions to her male counterparts.

Lee claimed that male officers frequently watched pornographic movies at the workplace and made sexually derogatory remarks about women. When she complained about male officers’ behavior, the department would conduct sham investigations, and then accuse her of misconduct for making those complaints.

A similar lawsuit was filed last week by Maj. Martha Helen Haire, a 22-year veteran of the LSU Police Department.

She sued the university claiming she was denied the position of chief of police, for which she was clearly qualified, because she is a woman.

Haire also claimed that she was harassed on account of her gender and “subjected to illegal retaliation/reprisal on account of her whistle-blowing activities consisting of protesting and opposing gender-based discrimination in the workplace.’”

Retaliation for complaining about discrimination and opposing discriminatory practices is illegal under Title VII.

It’s been decades since this kind of conduct has been declared illegal throughout the country yet sadly, the culture of discrimination and harassment in male dominated professions is awfully slow to change.

Images: corporette.com farm4.static.flickr.com

*This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on April 4, 2010. Reprinted with permission from the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon: is recognized as one of the leading  employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States.She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.

Southwest Flight Attendant Wins ADA Appeal

Monday, March 29th, 2010

Employee Fired For Taking Medical Leave Gets Jury Verdict Reinstated

When does too much time off for an illness justify a termination because of poor attendance? Not every time according to a case decided this past week from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Here’s what happened.

Facts Of The Case

Edward Carmona worked for Southwest Airlines as a flight attendant. He was plagued with psoriasis since he was a teen. As an adult, Carmona developed psoriatic arthritis which causes painful swelling and stiffness in the joints during attacks of psoriasis on the surface of his skin.

During flare-ups, Carmona is in great pain and has difficulty walking and moving around. The flare ups occur three or four times every month and each flare-up lasts for three or four days.

In order to get time off as needed for his condition, Carmona filed for intermittent leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. He was granted FMLA leave between 1998 and 2005, until Southwest determined that he had not worked enough hours to be eligible for renewal.

After Carmona’s FMLA leave expired, he was no longer able to excuse absences caused by his psoriatic arthritis. What followed was a round of progressive discipline which culminated in termination because of an accumulation of points relating to unexcused absences.

The Lawsuit

Carmona sued Southwest claiming that he was terminated because of his disability in violation of  the Americans with Disabilities Act. (ADA)*.

In order to prove an ADA claim, an individual must prove:

  • that he was an individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA
  • that he was a qualified individual for his job, despite his disability,
  • and that he was discharged because of his disability

In order to establish a disability, Carmona had to establish that he had:

  • a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities
  • a record of such an impairment or
  • that he was regarded as having such a impairment.

After a jury trial which Carmona won,  the judge granted judgment against Carmon as a matter of law on the grounds that he did not present sufficient evidence of a disability.  Specifically, the judge found Carmona’s intermittent limitations didn’t prove a substantially limiting impairment. In other words, the judge ruled that Carmona was not disabled as a matter of law and took away the verdict.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed in it’s opinion issued this week. You can read the decision here.

In sum, it held that the verdict should stand because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that:

  • Carmona had an impairment that substantially limited his major life activity of walking
  • he was a qualified individual for his job
  • he was terminated because of his disability
Take Away

This is a really good decision for those who have conditions which cause intermittent disabling flare-ups and need to take time off of work because of it. It will particularly benefit those employees who work for employers not covered by the FMLA (companies with less than 50 employees).

The case also has a helpful discussion on Southwest’s core argument — that Carmona was not qualified for the job because of his poor attendance.

It’s also  good decision for those with cases pending before the ADA amendments Act of 2008. The Court did not apply the amendments retroactively, yet still found for the plaintiff under the narrower pre-amendments law.

The Court also wrote about reinstatement as a remedy — another topic we don’t see very often in ADA opinions.

In sum,  this case is a good result for employees and instructive to employers on the interplay of attendance policies and the ADA.

( *Carmona also had a Title VII claim; the jury found against him on that claim )

Image: blog.cleveland.com

*This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on March 27, 2010. Reprinted with permission by the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon: is recognized as one of the leading  employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States.She offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. With a unique grasp of the issues, Ellen’s a sought-after legal analyst who discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net.


AIDS Discrimination Victim Gets New Trial

Thursday, March 25th, 2010

Admission Of EEOC No Probable Cause Determination Is Reversible Error

I ran across this case recently and I think it’s definitely worth talking about.  It deals with a real problem in discrimination cases that has been around for as long as I can remember and it affects just about everyone who files an EEOC charge.

The case, Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc., addresses the controversial issue regarding the admissibility of  EEOC findings at trial and it’s a good result for employees.

What’s The Problem?

When an individual files an EEOC charge, the EEOC  conducts an investigation. At its conclusion, the EEOC issues a determination letter stating one of two things:

  1. there was probable cause to believe that discrimination, retaliation, etc. occurred or
  2. there was no probable cause to believe that a violation of the civil rights law occurred

After the determination, the EEOC issues a Notice of Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue which gives the individual the right to go to court.

Here’s the potential problem for the employee who did not prevail at the EEOC (or its state counterpart).  At trial, the employer always tries to introduce the EEOC dismissal and no probable cause determination.

In effect,  the employer wants to argue to the jury, “the government investigated this case, didn’t find discrimination, and you shouldn’t either.” It doesn’t take Clarence Darrow to figure out that this argument can be quite damaging to the plaintiff’s case at trial.

What Happened In The Case

Cemeshia Byrd worked at Wendy’s in Coral Springs, Florida. Byrd filed a lawsuit against BT Foods (doing business as Wendy’s Coral Springs) claiming that she was discriminated against when she was terminated because she had Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).

Discrimination because of AIDS is illegal in the U.S. under the Americans with Disabilities Act. It’s also illegal under many state civil rights laws, including the Florida Omnibus Aids Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Before proceeding to court, Byrd filed a charge of discrimination with the Broward County Civil Rights Division, an agency which conducts investigations for the Equal Opportunity Commission.

After receiving a no probable cause letter of determination, Byrd filed a lawsuit in Broward County Circuit Court claiming discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Before trial, Byrd filed a Motion in Limine — which is a request for an order to exclude the admission of particular evidence at trial. Generally the gist of the augment on a Motion in Limine is that:

  • the evidence is irrelevant, highly prejudicial, or hearsay and
  • the jury should not be able to hear or see the evidence nor should there be any reference to it

In this case, Byrd asked for an exclusion of EEOC documents including the Notice of Determination and Notice of Dismissal of her EEOC charge.

She argued that the EEOC “NO PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT” written in capital letters in the Notice of Determination were highly misleading, unduly prejudicial, and too conclusory to provide any meaningful probative value . She also argued that the jury would be likely to give the dismissal and “no probable cause determination” more weight than is appropriate.

The judge ruled against Byrd and in favor of BT Foods on the Motion in Limine. During the trial, according to Byrd, BT Foods made the reasonable cause determination the centerpiece of its defense.

Byrd lost her jury trial and filed an appeal. In it she claimed that the court’s admission of the EEOC findings constituted reversible error which entitled her to a new trial.

The Court’s Ruling

With no Florida cases on point, the Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida looked to federal law for guidance on the issue of admissibility of EEOC findings at trial.

It noted that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered an EEOC determination “ordinarily admissible” and a decision which “rationalized that the reports are ‘highly probative’ due to the training and experience of the EEOC investigators.”

On the other hand, it went on to note that many federal courts have concluded that EEOC letters of determination are inherently prejudicial. The Court ultimately agreed that the letters in Byrd’s case should not have been admitted.

The Court wrote:

We agree with the reasoning of these courts, that a jury may find it hard, if not impossible, to independently evaluate the evidence presented to the parties after being informed that the EEOC has already investigated the claim and determined that reasonable cause does or does not exist to believe that unlawful discrimination has occurred…..

Several courts have reasoned that similar conclusory administrative determination letters, i.e., those which do little more than take sides, enjoy particularly low probative value, but possess especially high dangers of unfair prejudice.

The Court ruled that Byrd’s Motion in Limine should have been granted, reversed the lower court, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Take Away

The admissibility of EEOC findings has been plaguing lawyers who try discrimination cases since the civil rights laws were first passed. The whole issue has become much more important with the enactment of laws which give civil rights plaintiffs the right to to jury trials.

My former law students may recall that one of the first assignments I gave them was to draft a Motion in Limine regarding the admissibility of a probable cause finding and and argue its admissibility or exclusion.

As far as trials go, it should come as no surprise that  those of us who represent employees argue vociferously for the admission of a positive finding of discrimination by the EEOC. We argue just as strongly for the exclusion of a no probable cause finding.

Lawyers who represent employers of course make the same kind of arguments in reverse. I have had judges who have allowed the evidence in. I have had judges who have excluded it.

That’s why any law on this subject is helpful.

images: www.karlonia.com

*This blog originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on March 26, 2010. Reprinted with permission by the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. She’s recognized as one of the first and foremost employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States. Ellen’s a legal analyst and is available to discuss high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and women’s issues. Quoted often in local and national news media, Ellen has been a regular guest on television and radio, including appearances on Court TV. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net or call 1-888-915-1952.

Could This Be News? Employee Fired Because She Was Too Old And Too Expensive Has Right To Age Discrimination Trial

Wednesday, March 17th, 2010

Direct Evidence Of Age Discrimination Gets Plaintiff Jury Trial: Court Wrongfully Applied Mixed Motive Standard To Bounce The Case

It’s hard to believe that this age discrimination victim got thrown out of court and had to go to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a reversal but here’s what happened in the recently decided case of Mora v. Jackson Memorial Hospital.

Facts Of The Case

Sixty-two year old Josephine Mora worked for Jackson Memorial Hospital (“Hospital”) as a fundraiser. She initially worked for someone named Chea who recommended to the Hospital’s chief executive, Rodriguez, that she be fired. The reasons for the recommendation are not set out in the opinion.

Rodriguez first agreed, but then decided to give Mora a different position in his own office “where he could observe her more closely.” Mora worked with Rodriguez for a month. Rodriguez claimed during that time Mora was responsible for several errors and displayed a lack of professionalism.

At the end of the month, Rodriguez fired Mora. When he did so, according to Mora, Rodriguez called her into his office and said:

I need someone younger I can pay less … I need Elena [Quevedo, a 25 year old employee]

In addition, one employee heard Rodriguez tell Mora:

You are very old and inept. What you should be doing is taking care of old people. They really need you. I need somebody younger that I can pay less and I can control.

Another employee heard Rodriguez say “she’s too old to be working here anyway” in reference to Mora.

In the course of Mora’s lawsuit filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, (“ADEA”) Rodriguez denied making these discriminatory remarks. In addition, the Hospital argued that even if it did discriminate against Mora, she would have been fired anyway because of poor performance.

The district court agreed with the defendant, concluded that the Hospital had met its burden under the “same decision” affirmative defense, and granted judgment in favor of the Hospital. Mora appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit Reverses

Mixed Motive Analysis Wrongfully Applied

Part of the reason why the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision was because it found that the district court wrongfully applied a Title VII mixed motive analysis to an ADEA case.

The discussion involves a lot of complicated and tortured law, but here’s the simplest I can make it.

In the landmark Supreme Court case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decided in 1989, the evidence showed that the partners at Price Waterhouse made sexist remarks and engaged in gender stereotyping when they denied Ann Hopkins partnership in the firm. In other words, there was direct evidence of discrimination.

In its holding the Supreme Court set out a new standard which could be applied to cases with direct evidence of discrimination. In sum, when a plaintiff shows that race or sex discrimination was a motivating or substantial factor in an employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it would have made the same decision anyway (in the absence of the discriminatory motive.)

Since the Price Waterhouse decision, this kind of discrimination case is often referred to as a “mixed motive case” with a “same decision defense.”

In Moro’s case, the district court applied the Price Waterhouse mixed motive analysis and ruled that the Hospital proved its “same decision” defense. It concluded that Mora ‘s termination was inevitable given the number and severity of her workplace problems and that no reasonable jury could find otherwise. And so she lost as a matter of law.

The problem with the district court’s ruling — according to the 11th Circuit — is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBIS Financial Services (2009) held that the Price Waterhouse mixed motive burden shifting analysis only applied to discrimination claims brought under Title VII and did not apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. ( I wrote about the awful Gross case here and here)

Consequently, since the mixed motive burden shifting analysis was wrongly applied, the defense was not entitled to its same decision defense, and the district court’s reliance on that defense in finding against the plaintiff was reversible error.

The Jury Should Decide Whether Mora Was Fired Because Of Her Age

After the 11th Circuit explained why the district court’s analysis was wrong, it went on to explain what the correct analysis is – and unlike the above discussion, it’s all very straightforward from there.

A plaintiff in an ADEA case may prove illegal age discrimination with either direct or circumstantial evidence. Moro testified that she was fired because of her age, and two co-employees substantiated her. The Hospital denied that the comments were made which meant that material facts were in dispute and the case properly belonged in front of a jury.

As the Court put it:

The resolution of this case depends on whose account of the pertinent conversations a jury would credit. …..

A reasonable juror could find that Rodriguez’s statements should be taken at face value and that he fired Plaintiff because of her age. For us to conclude otherwise would be to deny Plaintiff the benefit of resolving all reasonable inferences in her favor as the nonmoving party.

Given the disputed question of material fact, Defendant was unentitled to a summary judgment.

Take Away

It’s awfully common for people to be let go because they are considered by some to be too old and too expensive. I can’t count the number of times I have represented people who were fired for just those reasons.

In this case, Josephine Mora was told, “you’re too old. I need to find someone younger and cheaper.” If it’s not a case of age discrimination, I don’t know what is.

It’s both astounding and disheartening that forty three years after the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, a court faced with such strong evidence of age discrimination could throw the plaintiff out, grant judgment in favor of the employer, and deprive the employee of her right to a jury trial

It’s a good thing the Eleventh Circuit fixed the mistake and published this opinion, because if this woman can’t get her age discrimination case in front of a jury, I have a hard time figuring out who can.

image: lawblog.legalmatch.com

About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the first and foremost employment and civil rights attorneys in the United States, Ellen Simon has been lauded for her work on landmark cases that established employment law in both state and federal court. A sought-after legal analyst and expert, she discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post www.employeerightspost.com/ has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. Learn more about Ellen Simon at www.ellensimon.net/.

JetBlue Loses Appeal On Hostile Work Ennvironment Age Discrimination And Retaliation Claims

Wednesday, March 10th, 2010

Complaints To Supervisor/Harasser Are Sufficient To Overcome Affirmative Defense On Hostile Environment Claim

There’s lots of meaty reading in the Second Circuit case of Gorzynski v JetBlue Airways Corporation decided this month. The 31 page opinion hits multiple issues including sexual harassment, age discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation.

The Federal District Court threw out the case on summary judgment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and this is why.

Facts Of The Case

It’s a long story, but here’s the gist of it.

JetBlue hired Diane Gorzynski as a customer service agent in January 2000 for its operation at Buffalo International Airport. She was 54 years old at the time. In May 2000 she was promoted to the position of Customer Service Supervisor and stayed in that position until she was fired on July 5, 2002.

The customer service supervisors were managed by James Celeste, the General Manager. William Thro, a regional manager, was responsible for overseeing the General Managers of several JetBlue stations.

During her employment, Gorzynski experienced age and gender discrimination including sexual harassment. She also observed discrimination of other employees. The main culprit was her supervisor, James Celeste.

Gorzynski complained to Celeste on numerous occasions about the discrimination and harassment she experienced and about the discrimination and harassment of her co-employees.

She was retaliated against and fired, she believed, because of her complaints.

The Lawsuit

Gorzynski filed a lawsuit claiming that JetBlue:

* discriminated against her because of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

* discriminated against her because of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

* retaliated against her for complaints to her supervisors about age and gender discrimination and race discrimination of co-employees in violation of Title VII and the ADEA

She also claimed numerous violations on the New York Human Rights Law.

The federal District Court granted JetBlue’s Motion for Summary Judgment of all claims. Gorzynski filed an appeal.

The Second Circuit Reverses

The Faragher/Ellerth Defense

One of the most important and interesting parts of the decision is its holding regarding JetBlue’s affirmative defense on which the District Court hung its hat to throw out Gorzynski’s sexual harassment claim – and it’s a holding which can effect lots of people.

In order to establish a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must produce enough evidence to show that the workplace was:

* permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is

* sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and

* create an abusive working environment

In analyzing a hostile environment claim, the court is required to “look at the record as a whole and assess the totality of the circumstances.”

In this case, Gorzynski presented evidence that Celeste:

* grabbed Gorzynsi and other women around the waist

* tickled them

* stared at them as if” he was mentally undressing them”

* made numerous sexual comments including remarks about wanting to suck on or massage their breasts.

The District Court did not consider this evidence. Instead, it found that JetBlue was entitled to win as a matter of law because of its “affirmative offense” under the Supreme Court Faragher and Ellerth decisions.

The employer is entitled to raise the defense in certain sexual harassment scenarios involving supervisors and co-workers if it can show that:

* it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any harassing behavior and

* the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid the harm

With respect to the first element, JetBlue presented evidence of its sexual harassment policy (contained in its employee handbook) which stated that: “any crewmember who believes that he or she is the victim of any type of discriminatory conduct, including sexual harassment, should bring that conduct to the immediate attention of his or her supervisor, the People Department or any member of management.”

JetBlue argued that Gorxynski was not entitled to proceed on her sexual harassment claim because she failed to take advantage of the policy in the handbook when she:

* only complained to her supervisor — the harasser

* did not complain to other members of management.

The District Court agreed with JetBlue and granted judgment in its favor on Gorzyynski’s sexual harassment claim.

The Second Circuit rejected the District Court’s conclusion and reversed. It stated:

We reject such a brittle reading of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. We do not believe that the Supreme Court, when it fashioned this affirmative defense, intended that victims of sexual harassment, in order to preserve their rights, must go from manager to manager until they find someone who will address their complaints.

Considering the courage it takes to complain about what are often humiliating events and the understandable fear of retaliation that exists in many sexual harassment situations, we decline to read the rule so rigidly.

Accordingly, we hold that an employer is not, as a matter of law, entitled to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense simply because an employer’s sexual harassment policy provides that the plaintiff could have complained to other persons as well as the alleged harasser.

Instead, we conclude that the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether, by not pursuing other avenues provided in the employer’s sexual harassment policy, the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s preventative measures.

In this case, the Court noted that:

* the other manager Gorzynski could have complained to was Thro — the regional manager

* the evidence showed that Thro was not receptive to receiving complaints from employees

* the evidence also showed that Thro was intimidating

* Thro retaliated against those who made complaints

Therefore, the Second Circuit held — in reinstating the sexual harassment claim — the question of whether or not Gorzynski unreasonably failed to take advantage of the options provided in the sexual harassment policy was a jury question.

Remaining Issues Of Fact For The Jury

Age Discrimination

Gorzyski established a prima facie case of age discrimination:

* she was over 40

* she was qualified for her position

* she was fired

* she was replaced by a woman in her 40’s

JetBlue countered this inference of age discrimination with its “legitimate business reason”: it fired Gorzynski because of her “management style,” “unprofessional conduct and poor interpersonal skills” and the “hostile work environment she created.”

The District Court found that Gorzynski did not present any evidence that JetBlue’s reasons were false or pretextual – and threw out her age discrimination claim.

The Second Circuit disagreed. Some of the evidence it noted was:

* the negative evaluation Gorzynski received from Celeste — a 2 out of 5 — was conducted after he had supervised her for only one week

* a contemporary, anonymous crewmember gave her a 4 out of 5

* at the same time Celeste gave Crowly, a 30 year old customer service rep. a 4 out of 5 even though Crowly had been written up and counseled on numerous occasions –Celeste then promoted him

* JetBlue’s investigation regarding an incident which immediately preceded Gorzynski’s discharge was “questionable at best”

* Celeste told Gorzynski she reminded him of his 80 year old aunt

* younger employees were not disciplined for violating numerous policies including smoking and sleeping on the job

The Court stated:

Given the cumulative weight of this evidence, we believe that a reasonable jury could find not only that the explanations given by JetBlue for Gorzynski’s termination were pretextual, but also that, together with Celeste’s passing comment about his aunt, it was her age that was the ‘but for’ cause of Gorzynski’s termination.

Accordingly, we vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Gorzynski’s age discrimination claims.

(the case also has a very interesting discussion of “age plus” discrimination in connection with her claim that Celeste discriminated against older women)

Retaliation

The District Court also dismissed Gorzynski’s claim that she was discharged in retaliation for complaining about race, gender and age discrimination.

In order to establish a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show

1. that she participated in a protected activity
2. suffered an adverse employment action
3. a causal connection between her engaging in the protected activity and the adverse employment action

The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s holding on the retaliation claims noting in part:

* five months – the time between Gorzynski expressed concern about a co-workers race discrimination and her discharge – was “not too long to find a causal relationship.”

* a complaint about a sexual harassment incident two months before her discharge sufficiently alleged a causal connection between her protected complaint about sex discrimination and her termination

* Gorzynski’s statements in her affidavit that there was unequal enforcement of the rules at the Buffalo station with respect to older employees versus younger employees should have been considered by the Court

In sum, the Court said

JetBlue has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Gorzynski’s termination, and Gorzynski has produced evidence that casts significant doubt on that rationale, leaving a triable issue as to whether JetBlue retaliated against her for complaining about prohibited discrimination.

Lessons To Be Learned

The decision is filled with points of law that are very helpful to employees who have filed employment discrimination claims. It gives numerous examples of what may be considered evidence of disparate treatment, pretext, and retaliation.

It also has a very interesting discussion of gender/age “plus” discrimination, where a subset of women are being discriminated against in the workplace, ie., older women, or black women, but not all women — which in reality is quite common.

Most noteworthy is the discussion of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. While it is critical for those who have been sexually harassed to complain to someone in management, the opinion makes it clear that victims of sexual harassment will not lose their rights because they did not complain to each person designated in a company’s sexual harassment policy.

Complaints to the supervisor/harasser are sufficient. That particular point of law will be a huge help to many victims.

Images: www.bajanfuhlife.com/news/news

*This article was originally published in Employee Rights Post on February 28, 2009. Reprinted with permission from the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the first and foremost employment and civil rights attorneys in the United States, Ellen Simon has been lauded for her work on landmark cases that established employment law in both state and federal court. A sought-after legal analyst and expert, she discusses high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and woman’s issues. Her blog, Employee Rights Post www.employeerightspost.com/ has dedicated readers who turn to Ellen for her advice and opinion. Learn more about Ellen Simon at www.ellensimon.net/.

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