On August 5, 2010, the California Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision concerning the type of evidence a worker can rely upon to prove an employer discriminated against him or her. The Court’s decision concerns the so-called “stray remarks doctrine.”

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor coined the term in a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision, writing that “stray remarks” made by “non-decisionmaking coworkers or remarks made by decisionmaking supervisors outside of the decisional process” are insufficient evidence of an employer’s discriminatory attitude. Without additional evidence of discrimination, she wrote, a gender discrimination claim can be and should be dismissed by the court before trial.

In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) 490 U.S. 228, the worker presented evidence that a partner of the firm told her to “walk more femininely,” “talk more femininely,” “dress more femininely,” “wear make-up,” “have her hair styled,” and “wear jewelry” to improve her chances for partnership. Justice O’Connor concluded that though such “stray remarks” might constitute evidence of a discriminatory attitude in the workplace, they are not sufficient evidence of discrimination on their own. When combined with more direct kinds of evidence of discrimination, however, stray remarks evidence can tend to support a discrimination claim.

Since 1989, some federal courts have expanded the stay remarks doctrine substantially. In Hill v. Lockheed Martin, for example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that remarks by non-decisionmakers that the worker was a “useless old lady” “who needed to retire” and was a “troubled old lady,” did not influence the decisional process directly and, therefore, were completely irrelevant to the worker’s discrimination claim.

In its August 5th decision, the California Supreme Court concluded that the wholesale rejection of evidence of stray remarks, as suggested by the Fourth Circuit, is improper. It explained that such evidence can tend to show discriminatory animus or attitudes within the workplace. Under California law, then, stray remarks are relevant and cannot be completely ignored by the trial courts in ruling on pre-trial motions for summary judgment.

While the California Supreme Court’s decision focuses on evidentiary issues and pretrial procedures, the importance of the decision for California workers is significant. Although a racial, sexual or age-based slur might not conclusively demonstrate employment discrimination, such stray remarks combined with other more direct evidence of discrimination (statistics, testimony, emails and the like) can be used to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment before trial.

The California Supreme Court explained that “[T]he stray remarks doctrine contains a major flaw because discriminatory remarks by a non-decisionmaking employee can influence a decision maker.” Thus, stray remarks can constitute evidence of discriminatory animus. The Supreme Court of California found another federal appellate court’s position on the stray remarks doctrine persuasive. In Shager v. Upjohn Co. (7th Cir. 1990) 913 F.2d 398, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: “If [the formal decision maker] acted as the conduit of [an employee‘s] prejudice – his cat‘s paw – the innocence of [the decision maker] would not spare the company from liability.”

Thus, for example, discriminatory comments by a worker capable of influencing the actual decisionmakers can provide admissible evidence of discrimination by the employer.

This is good news for workers in California who often find it difficult to unearth more direct evidence of discrimination. While the California Supreme Court ultimately concluded that, on their own, inappropriate stray remarks by non-decisionmakers do not prove discrimination, its decision will permit workers to present evidence of stray remarks in the context of other discriminatory practices in the workplace.

About the Author: Patrick Kitchin is a labor rights attorney with offices in San Francisco and Alameda, California. He has represented thousands of employees in both individual and class action cases involving violations of California and federal labor laws since founding his firm in 1999. According to retail experts and the media, his wage and hour class actions against Polo Ralph Lauren, Gap, Banana Republic, and Chico’s led to substantial changes in the retail industry’s labor practices in California. Patrick is a 1992 graduate of The University of Michigan Law School and is personally and professionally committed to the protection of workers’ rights everywhere.

It may not seem credible that gender discrimination remains widespread and systemic in American workplaces. Women outnumber men in colleges and graduate programs; they have entered the workforce in force; women run some companies, universities, states, and departments of the federal government.

Despite all this progress, though, discrimination persists. Women are only 17% of Congress members. Women head a mere 2.6% of Fortune 500 companies. In other words, men still overwhelmingly control our most powerful political institutions and our economy.

The familiar glass ceiling argument could explain this striking disparity: women can rise up through the ranks professionally, but at some point they hit the glass ceiling and cannot go any higher. If that were the only problem, it might explain why women are so conspicuously absent from the powerful positions listed above. But the gender disparities start well below the highest levels of power.

A striking pattern emerges from statistics analyzing the numbers of women at various levels in financial services companies (which I’ve become familiar with from representing so many women in discrimination cases against them). At the entry level, there can be as many female as male employees. At the next level up, women make up a smaller percentage of employees. At the next level, even fewer of the workers are women. And on it goes, until you reach the near complete absence of women from the position of CEO. Graphically, the numbers describe a pyramid: with every promotion the percentage of women shrinks.

Social scientists like William Bielby of the University of Illinois at Chicago and Barbara Reskin of the University of Washington have studied this phenomenon and traced it to its roots: unconscious bias that affects subjective decision-making.

Even the most fair-minded people are subject to unconscious biases. The Implicit Association Test is one of many studies to demonstrate that people can have strong preferences and antipathies they may not be aware of. Even people who consider themselves very fair-minded can be unconsciously prejudiced against minorities, for example. To give a very rough summary of part of the underlying theory, people tend to think in terms of “in groups” and “out groups.” My “in group” is the group of people who are like me in salient ways such as gender, race, religion, age, educational background, profession, family status, etc. I tend to attribute more positive characteristics to members of the in group and more negative characteristics to members of the out group, who are unlike me. For instance, as a native Midwesterner, I may unconsciously prefer fellow Midwesterners to people from other parts of the country, although if you ask me whether I think Midwesterners are better than other Americans in any way, I will honestly answer that I don’t. The bias is unconscious.

Unconscious biases operate in the workplace as they do in every other sphere of human interaction, with the result that the groups in power tend to stay in power. Male managers may subconsciously believe that other men are more capable than women, outperform women, or are more committed to their work than women. Again, these beliefs can be subconscious, but they still affect decision-making. When it comes to a subjective decision such as who deserves a promotion, a male manager with an unconscious bias in favor of men is more likely to promote a man than a woman. The same is true of granting raises, distributing assignments, and making opportunities like management training available. This is how unconscious bias can combine with subjective decision-making to favor men (and other groups like whites) and to create the pyramid that leaves women at the lower corporate levels while disproportionately men climb to power.

There are other factors at work here too. People tend not only to think more highly of members of their in group, but to be more comfortable with them. As a result, a male manager may invite some employees to a golf outing or to dinner – nothing formal, just being a down-to-earth supervisor. He invites the employees with whom he feels most comfortable or thinks he has the most in common. A slew of scientific studies demonstrate that he is likely to feel most comfortable with the employees who belong to his in group – in this case, men. As a result, he gets to know his male subordinates better and become friends with them. When plum assignments or opportunities for promotion arise, the manager is more likely to dole them out to the subordinates he is more comfortable working with and is friends with.

Unconscious bias is difficult if not impossible to change. Researchers including Frank Dobbin of Harvard University have shown that common techniques for combating prejudice, such as diversity training, not only do not help – they actually backfire.

The way to tackle workplace discrimination is not to try to change people’s unconscious thoughts, but to make decision-making processes less subjective and therefore less vulnerable to unconscious bias. Action must come from the top of the organization: an employer that provides clear, objective criteria to guide otherwise subjective decisions, and that enforces the use of those criteria, will make the workplace less discriminatory by diminishing the opportunity for decision-makers’ unconscious biases to affect their judgment.

The settlement of the gender discrimination class action against Novartis discussed in the first part of this post takes a stab at making these kinds of changes. It requires Novartis to clarify and systematize the criteria for evaluating employees, to train managers to evaluate employees fairly, and to “calibrate” evaluations to check that evaluators are applying performance criteria in a uniform manner.

Where bias is conscious and discrimination is intentional, decision-makers will find ways around objective criteria for decision-making. Conscious prejudice presents an entirely different set of challenges than unconscious bias. But I’d like to believe that a lot of workplace discrimination results from unconscious bias and that employers will improve their procedures to protect decision-making processes from that bias. Some employers have already done so, albeit usually under court order (demonstrating the need for more discrimination class actions). Employer initiatives to make subjective decision-making more objective will help end workplace discrimination. Please post a comment to share your workplace experience

About The Author: Piper Hofman is a writer and attorney living in Brooklyn with a B.A. magna cum laude from Brown University and a J.D. cum laude from Harvard Law School.  She has professional experience with the laws related to employment, animal rights, poverty, homelessness, and women’s rights.

Admission Of EEOC “No Probable Cause“ Determination Is Reversible Error

I ran across this case recently and I think it’s definitely worth talking about.  It deals with a real problem in discrimination cases that has been around for as long as I can remember and it affects just about everyone who files an EEOC charge.

The case, Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc., addresses the controversial issue regarding the admissibility of  EEOC findings at trial and it’s a good result for employees.

What’s The Problem?

When an individual files an EEOC charge, the EEOC  conducts an investigation. At its conclusion, the EEOC issues a determination letter stating one of two things:

1. there was probable cause to believe that discrimination, retaliation, etc. occurred or
   
2. there was no probable cause to believe that a violation of the civil rights law occurred

After the determination, the EEOC issues a Notice of Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue which gives the individual the right to go to court.

Here’s the potential problem for the employee who did not prevail at the EEOC (or its state counterpart).  At trial, the employer always tries to introduce the EEOC dismissal and no probable cause determination.

In effect,  the employer wants to argue to the jury, “the government investigated this case, didn’t find discrimination, and you shouldn’t either.” It doesn’t take Clarence Darrow to figure out that this argument can be quite damaging to the plaintiff’s case at trial.

What Happened In The Case

Cemeshia Byrd worked at Wendy’s in Coral Springs, Florida. Byrd filed a lawsuit against BT Foods (doing business as Wendy’s Coral Springs) claiming that she was discriminated against when she was terminated because she had Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).

Discrimination because of AIDS is illegal in the U.S. under the Americans with Disabilities Act. It’s also illegal under many state civil rights laws, including the Florida Omnibus Aids Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Before proceeding to court, Byrd filed a charge of discrimination with the Broward County Civil Rights Division, an agency which conducts investigations for the Equal Opportunity Commission.

After receiving a no probable cause letter of determination, Byrd filed a lawsuit in Broward County Circuit Court claiming discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Before trial, Byrd filed a Motion in Limine – which is a request for an order to exclude the admission of particular evidence at trial. Generally the gist of the augment on a Motion in Limine is that:

• the evidence is irrelevant, highly prejudicial, or hearsay and
  

• the jury should not be able to hear or see the evidence nor should there be any reference to it

In this case, Byrd asked for an exclusion of EEOC documents including the Notice of Determination and Notice of Dismissal of her EEOC charge.

She argued that the EEOC “NO PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT” written in capital letters in the Notice of Determination were highly misleading, unduly prejudicial, and too conclusory to provide any meaningful probative value . She also argued that the jury would be likely to give the dismissal and “no probable cause determination” more weight than is appropriate.

The judge ruled against Byrd and in favor of BT Foods on the Motion in Limine. During the trial, according to Byrd, BT Foods made the reasonable cause determination the centerpiece of its defense.

Byrd lost her jury trial and filed an appeal. In it she claimed that the court’s admission of the EEOC findings constituted reversible error which entitled her to a new trial.

The Court’s Ruling

With no Florida cases on point, the Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida looked to federal law for guidance on the issue of admissibility of EEOC findings at trial.

It noted that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered an EEOC determination “ordinarily admissible” and a decision which “rationalized that the reports are ‘highly probative’ due to the training and experience of the EEOC investigators.”

On the other hand, it went on to note that many federal courts have concluded that EEOC letters of determination are inherently prejudicial. The Court ultimately agreed that the letters in Byrd’s case should not have been admitted.

The Court wrote:

We agree with the reasoning of these courts, that a jury may find it hard, if not impossible, to independently evaluate the evidence presented to the parties after being informed that the EEOC has already investigated the claim and determined that reasonable cause does or does not exist to believe that unlawful discrimination has occurred…..

Several courts have reasoned that similar conclusory administrative determination letters, i.e., those which do little more than take sides, enjoy particularly low probative value, but possess especially high dangers of unfair prejudice.

The Court ruled that Byrd’s Motion in Limine should have been granted, reversed the lower court, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Take Away

The admissibility of EEOC findings has been plaguing lawyers who try discrimination cases since the civil rights laws were first passed. The whole issue has become much more important with the enactment of laws which give civil rights plaintiffs the right to to jury trials.

My former law students may recall that one of the first assignments I gave them was to draft a Motion in Limine regarding the admissibility of a probable cause finding and and argue its admissibility or exclusion.

As far as trials go, it should come as no surprise that  those of us who represent employees argue vociferously for the admission of a positive finding of discrimination by the EEOC. We argue just as strongly for the exclusion of a no probable cause finding.

Lawyers who represent employers of course make the same kind of arguments in reverse. I have had judges who have allowed the evidence in. I have had judges who have excluded it.

That’s why any law on this subject is helpful.

images: www.karlonia.com

*This blog originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on March 26, 2010. Reprinted with permission by the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon offers legal advice to individuals on employment rights, age/gender/race and disability discrimination, retaliation and sexual harassment. She’s recognized as one of the first and foremost employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States. Ellen’s a legal analyst and is available to discuss high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and women’s issues. Quoted often in local and national news media, Ellen has been a regular guest on television and radio, including appearances on Court TV. For more information go to www.ellensimon.net or call 1-888-915-1952.

Employee Terminated Because Of Bankruptcy Gets Right To Trial In Federal Court

I must admit that I don’t ever remember seeing a case involving bankruptcy discrimination — so when I ran across a recent federal court case out of Florida on the subject, it struck me as one well worth talking about.

The case,  Myers v. TooJay’s Management Corporation, is important because there are so few cases on the topic and because bankruptcy affects so many people. The case also highlights some flaws in the statute which could really use a Congressional fix.

What Happened In The Case

Plaintiff Eric Myers filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in January of 2008. Around the same time, Myers moved his family to Florida to live with his parents. His debts were fully discharged in May of 2008.

At some point, Myers heard about an opening at one of Defendant TooJay’s restaurants in Sumter County, Florida for a management position.  He called the company contact, Tom Thornton, about the position. Thornton interviewed Myers and the interview went well.

Myers was then scheduled for a two day on the job evaluation which was held at on July 31st and August 1st. During those two days, for which he was paid,  Myers shadowed various employees.became familiar with restaurant procedures.

At the end of the second day, Thornton told Myers that he had performed well and according to Myers, offered him a job.  He was told that he was supposed to start work on August 18, 2008 at a salary of between $50,000 and $55,000 for a 40 hour week.

Thornton contended that he never told Myers he was officially hired, never discussed hours, salary, or a start date.

Thornton contended  he told Myers that any offer of employment was contingent on a background check.

There was no dispute that Thornton photocopied Myers’ drivers license and social security card and had Myers complete and sign several employment forms including :

• an IRS withholding W-4 form

• an order form for TooJay’s uniform and shoes

• a food employee reporting agreement

• an assistant manger trade secret non-disclosure agreement

• an I-9 employment eligibility verification form.

Thornton also gave Myers a copy of TooJay’s employee handbook and sexual harassment policy, and directed Myers to sign forms indicating that he received copies. On each form, Myers signed in the blank listed for “employee signature.”

Myers was also asked to sign a document which permitted TooJay to conduct a background check and consumer credit report check.

After that, Myers notified his then employer that he was resigning so that he could start at TooJay’s.

A little more than a week later, Myers received a letter from TooJay’s stating that it was rescinding its previous offer of employment because of the credit report. He called the Vice President of Human Resources and was told that he was not hired because he had filed for bankruptcy and that TooJay’s, as a matter of corporate policy, did not hire individuals who had a bankruptcy on their credit report.

Myers went back to his prior employer and asked for his job back but it was too late. His work hours had already been distributed to other employees, and he was told that he could only be rehired at a reduced schedule.

According to Myers no one told him that his employment at TooJay’s was contingent on a satisfactory credit report.

Myers filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Florida claiming bankruptcy discrimination in violation of 11 U.S.C s. 525(b).

Issues In The Case

The defendant TooJay filed a motion for summary judgment asking that the case be thrown out on the grounds that:

• the statute only applied to discrimination after an employee was hired

• the statute did not prohibit bankruptcy discrimination with respect to hiring decisions

• Myers was never hired so the statute did not apply

Myers argued that:

• the statue applied to hiring decisions in which an employer refused to hire an individual because of bankruptcy

• the statute applied because Myers had been offered employment,

• he accepted the offer and was terminated because of the bankruptcy

The Court’s Decision

The Failure To Hire Claim

The Court analyzed Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code which protects individuals from discrimination. 

For whatever reason, there are two different standards in these bankruptcy discriminaion statutes– one for governmental employees [s.525(a)] and one for private employees [s.525 (b)] – and they are different.

The language of the statute regarding governmental employees states that the government :

[M]ay not . .. deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act or another person with whom such bankrupt has been associated . . .

Section 525 (b) was enacted several years later. It applies to private employers. Peculiarly, while the topic is the same, the language is different. It states that:

No private employer may terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against an individual who is or has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with such debtor or bankrupt,….

As the statutory language set forth above indicates, the section pertaining to government employees prohibits an employer from “denying employment” to a person because of bankruptcy.

The section pertaining to private employers does not contain a similar provision.

Therefore, according to the Court,  the section which applies to private employees only prohibits discrimination because of bankruptcy to those already employed.

If Congress intended a different result, the Court reasoned, it would have chosen different words in the statute. (as the opinion points out, only one court has reached a contrary result)

As the opinion states:

Thus by its plain language, the statute does not provide a cause of action against private employers for persons who are denied employment due to their bankrupt status….

In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, [a court should ] conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.

Summary judgment was granted for the defendant TooJay on Myers discriminatory hiring claim.

The Termination Claim

Both parties agreed that terminating an individual’s employment because of bankruptcy status violates 11 U.S.C.s. 525(b).

Meyers argued that an employment relationship with TooJay’s was created on July 31 and August, 1, 2008.  When TooJay rescinded its offer of employment, Meyers claimed, it fired him solely because of his prior bankruptcy in violation of the statute.

TooJay contended that an employment relationship was never created.

The Court found that based on the evidence presented,  the jury could determine that an employment relationship was created.  Important to the Court was proof that:

• Thornton made Myers an unconditional offer of employment
  

• The parties finalized all key employment terms, such as start date, hours of operation,job duties,and salary
  

• Myers signed numerous employee-related forms and received a copy of the handbook

• Myers  actually worked for TooJay’s for two day.

On the other hand, as the Court pointed out TooJay presented evidence through Thornton’s testimony that:

• Myers was never employed by TooJay’s and that
  

• only a conditional offer of employment was made — contingent on a clean background and credit check.

Based on the record and the “material facts in dispute” TooJay’s motion for summary judgment was denied.  Meyers won his right to have a jury hear his claim.

Conclusion

It’s important for all employers to know that it’s illegal to terminate an individual because of an individual’s bankruptcy status.

Hiring decisions are more problematic. Government employers can’t refuse to hire a candidate because of bankruptcy. Private employers, according to most courts, are not covered by the bankruptcy statute with respect to offers of employment.  This makes no sense.

In light of today’s economy, with so many Americans sadly having to declare bankruptcy, these statues should be reconciled so that they are consistent.

All employers should be prohibited from discriminating against individuals due to bankruptcy with respect to all aspects of employment. Congress should amend the language of S. 525(b) so that private employers can’t refuse to hire someone because of bankruptcy.

After all, aren’t these the folks who desperately need to work and earn some income? Isn’t this why we have bankruptcy discrimination laws?

image: newzar.files.wordpress.com

www.floridabeerfestivals.com

*This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on December 15, 2009. Reprinted with permission from the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the first and foremost employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States. With more than $50* million in verdicts and settlements and over 30 years of experience, Ellen has been listed in Best Lawyers in America and in the National Law Journal as one of the nation’s leading litigators. She has been lauded for her work on landmark cases that established employment law in both state and federal court. Ellen also possesses a wealth of knowledge as a legal analyst discussing high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and women’s issues. Ms. Simon has been quoted often in local and national news media and is a regular guest on television and radio, including appearances on Court TV. She is the author of the Employee Rights Post, a legal blog devoted to employee and civil rights.

*prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome

Workers employed in low-wage and poorly regulated industries (most prominently restaurants, residential construction, domestic cleaning, and mechanics) are confronted with staggering exploitation as employers look to cut corners in today’s recession. Such exploitation includes health and safety violations, discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, firing for participating in union activity, and wage theft—failure to pay workers for work performed, including overtime hours and final pay periods.

To combat this wave of illegality, a Chicago worker center has collaborated with a local university to create a map of law-breaking employers against which they have organized, giving workers and activists a powerful visual tool to bring to politicians and the community.

The Arise Chicago Worker Center has no shortage of evidence for the dire conditions facing Chicago’s low-wage workers, having collaborated with over 2,050 workers in the past seven years.

None of the restaurant workers who have contacted our organization during that time received overtime wages. One of our members seriously injured his back at a construction site, but his employer refused to pay legally required workers’ compensation. One African-American member, who works for a state-funded social service agency, has consistently received paychecks one to three weeks late, for more than two years. A group of candy manufacturers were denied bathroom breaks.

Recently, we spoke with a Guatemalan immigrant car wash worker who works from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m., six days a week, for $5.25 an hour. He does not receive overtime pay and takes home an average of $9 a day in tips. If that weren’t enough, the employer does not provide gloves needed for the work, and illegally deducts the cost of the workers’ required uniform from his paychecks.

With the help of the University of Illinois-Chicago Center for Urban Economic Development, Arise has mapped by ward—a political district—the law-breaking employers against which Arise has organized. The maps illustrate law-breaking employers in 43 of Chicago’s 50 wards, affecting workers living in 47 of the wards.

Groups of worker center members plan to meet with their ward aldermen to discuss workplace abuses and enlist support for a city response to the biggest problem facing low-wage workers: wage theft.

Clergy whose congregations are located in the 43 wards will join the workers. Recently, Catholic Bishop John Manz attended a meeting with Alderman Danny Solis in the 25th Ward, where Arise has recorded a dozen labor violations.

Solis committed to introducing the issue to the city council’s Hispanic Caucus, whose wards include great concentrations of Arise membership. Alderman Mary Ann Smith’s office offered to explore legislative strategies that could deny additional business permits to law-breaking employers. Additional meetings and research are planned to determine the best approach to address wage theft in Chicago—which may include a citywide ordinance that could make stealing a worker’s wages treated like other forms of theft.

*This post originally appeared in Labor Notes on December 3, 2009. Reprinted with permission from the author.

About the Author: Adam Kader (www.arisechicago.org) is the director of the Arise Chicago Worker Center, part of the national Interfaith Worker Justice network.

Employee With MS Wins Appeal In Seventh Circuit “Regarded As” Disability Decision

A case was decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals last week that was an important victory for the employee as well as his lawyers.

In Brunker v. Schwan’s Home Service, Inc. the Court reversed judgment in favor of Schwan’s on Brunker’s disability claim. It also reversed the lower court’s testy imposition of sanctions against Brunker’s lawyers.

What Happened In The Case.

Frank Brunker worked as a delivery driver for Schwan’s delivering frozen food to its customers. In February of 2003, Brunker started experiencing shaking of his hands, slurred speech, dizziness, light headedness, and headaches.

The symptoms continued, Brunker went to the doctor, tests were taken, and Brunker was told that he might have multiple sclerosis.

Brunker went on disability leave for two months. Eventually, he went back to light duty work, and then back to work without any restrictions by his physician. He performed his job and was able to complete his route in the same manner as he had in the past.

Four months later, Brunker told his supervisor that he wanted to go to the Mayo Clinic for some tests. Around the same time, he stared to get written up for various performance issues.

When Brunker returned two weeks later, after being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, his supervisor fired him citing “unsatisfactory performance” and “unable to perform essential job functions” on the termination form.

(Notably, Brunker’s supervisor backdated the termination form to September 9, the day Brunker left for the clinic and before his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis.)

Brunker filed a claim in federal court for disability discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act. The lower court (N.D. Indiana) threw out the case and in an unusual move, sanctioned Brunker’s lawyers because of their discovery requests (attempts to get evidence to prove their case).

The Seventh Circuit Reverses

It would be tempting to go in to all of the reasons why the lower court’s opinion was just flat out wrong, but some of them don’t matter anymore since the Americans With Disabilities Act was amended to prevent precisely this result.

Multiple Sclerosis Is A Disability

The first part of the lower court’s ruling pronounced that Brunker had no claim because he was not disabled. In other words, the fact that he had multiple sclerosis didn’t matter, according to the court — even if that’s why he was fired — because MS was not a disability.

The court’s logic was based on case law developed under the ADA which left millions of people with disabilities unprotected from employment discrimination.

Fortunately,  the ADA was amended this past year. Under the new act, multiple sclerosis would be considered a disability (and should have been under the old act as well) so a judge theoretically should not be able to throw the case out on similar grounds. (the court did not address the amended ADA because the case was filed before it was passed)

(For information on new regulations proposed under the amended ADA see the article in the Connecticut Employment Law Blog)

Being Regarded As Disabled Is A Violation Of The ADA

Under the ADA (both the old act and the new one) a person has a claim for disability discrimination if he or she is subjected to an adverse employment decision because he or she is regarded as disabled.

To prove disability discrimination under a “regarded as” theory the employee can win by proving that:

• The employer mistakenly believes that the employee has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, or
  

• The employer mistakenly believes that an existing impairment, which is not actually limiting, does substantially limit a major life activity (functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working)

In this case, the Court of Appeals decided that Brunker presented enough evidence that he was fired because Schwan’s regarded him as being disabled. In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:

The record contains adequate evidence to support a theory that Schwan’s regarded Brunker as being disabled in the major life activities of walking, caring for himself, and speaking.

For example, the day before he left for the Mayo Clinic, Schwan”s issued Brunker multiple corrective action reports, including a dress code violation, suggesting that Schwan’s did not believe that Brunker was able to care for himself because of his apparent conditions.

Furthermore, Schwan’s disciplined him even though other employees were not cited for similar violations.

As to Schwan’s motive, the Court of Appeals had this to say:

Schwan’s fired Brunker immediately after he returned from treatment, but Schwan’s backdated the termination notice to before he left for the clinic, evidently hoping to avoid the impression that his apparent condition influenced Schwan’s decision to terminate him.

These facts are sufficient to create a triable question as to whether Schwan’s regarded Bunker as disabled when it fired him.

The Court Reverses Sanctions Against The Lawyers

It’s typical in these kinds of lawsuits for lawyers representing employees to request documents from the employer defendant to either prove their case  or disprove the defendant’s case. It not only typical; it is absolutely allowed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In what I can only say is a quirky, outlandish, and mean-spirited ruling, the trial court in this case imposed sanctions on Brunker’s lawyers because they pressed to get the information they believed necessary to properly represent their client.

For example, the lawyers asked for records on whether Schawn disciplined other employees who failed to follow its dress code or to keep accurate route books (some of the reasons give for the discharge).

A request to see co-employees personnel files in order to prove unequal  treatment or whether what the company is stating is true (pretext) is quite standard, but in this case the lawyers were sanctioned for making it.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the information was relevant to Brunker’s disparate treatment claim since it related to the even handedness of the company’s expectations.

The Court also criticized the company’s lawyers for refusing to produce the requested documents and then using them to support their defense.

The Court said:

Indeed Schwan’s went further than merely raising an issue it had previously argued was irrelevant.

It faulted Brunker for failing to identify any route manager who had “similar performance issues” and was treated more favorably.

And Schwan’s also discussed the route manager who was terminated for failing to service customers, despite Schwan’s successful opposition to Brunker’s request for his personnel file.

Similarly,  Schwan denied the relevance of the personnel file of another former employee, Mike Devereaux, but then used parts of that file in the summary judgment reply.

Through its actions, Schwan’s concedes that the bulk Brunker’s requests were substantially justified. We therefore vacate the award of sanctions.

Conclusion

This case is a great win for both Mr. Brunker and his lawyers. He obviously had grounds to bring a case claiming that he was terminated because of his disability – and every right to have that case heard by a jury.

As far as the lawyers go, it’s always very difficult to get companies to produce the documents we need to prove our cases. Companies control the records in these cases and they do not give them up easily even when they are plainly relevant.

At the same time there is no doubt that lawyers representing employees have to get those documents both to support our clients claims and test the employers’ defenses. It’s simply a battle that must be fought.

The fact that these lawyers were punished for doing what they needed to do for proper representation of their client is plainly wrong. Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

images: www.pocketyourdollars.com bowtielaw.files.wordpress.com

This post originally appeared in Employee Rights Post on November 1, 2009. Reprinted with permission from the author.

About the Author: Ellen Simon is recognized as one of the first and foremost employment and civil rights lawyers in the United States. With more than $50* million in verdicts and settlements and over 30 years of experience, Ellen has been listed in Best Lawyers in America and in the National Law Journal as one of the nation’s leading litigators. She has been lauded for her work on landmark cases that established employment law in both state and federal court. Ellen also possesses a wealth of knowledge as a legal analyst discussing high-profile civil cases, employment discrimination and women’s issues. Ms. Simon has been quoted often in local and national news media and is a regular guest on television and radio, including appearances on Court TV. She is the author of the Employee Rights Post, a legal blog devoted to employee and civil rights.

*prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome

One of the few openly gay TV anchors in the country–Charles Perez of WPLG in Miami–has filed a charge with the local human rights authority alleging sexual orientation and gender discrimination by station managers that resulted in his demotion from weeknight anchor. Perez says his openly gay news director made comments about his performance and on-air presence that reflected anti-gay animus and that he was treated differently from heterosexual news employees.

According to the intake questionairre filed with the Miami-Dade Equal Opportunity Board–Florida does not protect employees from discrimination based on sexual orientation and so the claim would gay bias claim would be brought under local law–Perez says that beginning in March 2009 he was subjected to bias at the hands of news director Bill Pohovey. The turning point appears to be an e-mail that was distributed by Perez’s ex-partner implying Perez was seeking the assistance of a therapist for issues relating to “gender identity issues.”

The allegations–and they are allegations at this point–suggest that Perez had been criticized for being “too anchor-like” and that he needed to lighten up with his female co-anchor, but then was told he should not interact with his co-anchor like “girlfriends.” He also alleges the news director made comments to him about marriage and family that he would never make to a heterosexual employee.

The complaint paints a picture of the news director showing photographs of “conquests” and talking explicitly about sex at one moment and then suggesting Perez was “too soft” the next.

In a statement from the station, Pohevey said “[a]s a gay man myself, I can safely say the Station does not discriminate against gay people. Charles’ claim that the Station discriminates against gay people is untrue and offensive. WPLG has a reputation of being a leader in this community with a very diverse staff. The Station does not discriminate. The Station will bring the facts out in the appropriate legal forum and fully expects to be completely vindicated.”

At this stage of the game, these are classic “he said, she he said” allegations. Perez provides a lot of evidence of conversations between him and the station and makes a number of inferences about the meaning of those conversations. There isn’t a lot of case law to parse out what is considered evidence of sexual orientation discrimination, although he clearly is making the argument that inferences of him being “soft” and “girlfriends” has homophobic overtones.

It’s also not true that a member of the same protected class–another openly gay man, in this case–cannot also discriminate. From same-sex sexual harassment cases to race discrimination cases, courts have never been persuaded that someone of the same protected class can’t also be a harasser or a discriminatory actor.

michael R. Triplett: Michael Triplett is the president of the Washington, D.C., chapter of NLGJA and a member of the NLGJA Rapid Response Task Force. He is the assistant chief of correspondents for BNA.

This article was originally posted at RE:ACT on August 4, 2009 and is reprinted here with permission fromt he author.

After years of trying to amend the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA
(http://www.eeoc.gov/types/ada.html) to make it more inclusive, in January, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAA) (http://www.ada.gov/pubs/ada.htm) went into effect. The ADAA makes it illegal for private employers, state and local governments, employment agencies and labor unions to discriminate against qualified individuals with disabilities in job application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.

In an attempt to make it easier to bring disability discrimination claims under the ADA, the amendment emphasizes that the definition of disability should be broadly interpreted. The Workplace Fairness website has been updated to reflect the changes made to the ADA, at our site’s disability discrimination page: (http://www.workplacefairness.org/disability).

An important component of the ADAA directed the EEOC to make new, broader, and more inclusive regulations to the original act. The effects of this, for the most part, remain to be seen, and will not be fully known until more disability discrimination cases are litigated under the Amendments. However, it is clear that the amendments’ intent will allow for a larger number of affected people to successfully bring forth disability discrimination claims.

The Act’s original intent was to protect those who “[have] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such an individual.” Since the Act’s inception, this portion of the regulation had been interpreted quite narrowly. In Sutton et al. v. United Air Lines, Inc. (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/97-1943.ZS.html), the Supreme Court held that
“mitigating measures” used by an employee must be taken into consideration in determining whether one has a disability under the ADA. The Court determined that petitioners, applicants for jobs as airline pilots with uncorrected vision of 20/200, did not qualify as “disabled” under the ADA because the use of mitigating measures (in this case, eyeglasses) could alleviate their poor vision. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/97-1992.ZS.html), the Court upheld the termination of the plaintiff whom suffered from hypertension because if medicated, Murphy’s hypertension was controlled. Because none of the plaintiffs in either case suffered from physical limitations when using the mitigating measures, they were not determined to be individuals with disabilities.

The amendments direct the EEOC to clarify and expand the definition of substantially limiting impairment. Under the amendments, these criteria are to be interpreted more broadly. Not only are most activities that were previously recognized under the law included (walking, seeing, etc.), but major bodily functions (normal cell growth, bowel, bladder, reproductive functions, and more) are now recognized as “major life activities.” The implications of this are potentially quite sweeping, as diseases which may not have qualified for protection previously may be granted it now. The ADAA does not expressly provide a definition for what constitutes a “major life activity,” but the ADAA unequivocally rejects the notion that major life activities should be limited to those activities which have “central importance” to an individual’s day to day life. People with health issues, such as reproductive disorders or heart disease may now be deemed disabled and, as such, be awarded the protections of the ADA.http://www.advocacyinc.org/index.cfm), properly notes that the draft regulations
would “appear to establish any type of diabetes are a disability,” as the impairments of diabetes affect certain normal life activities. Some examples of this are diabetes affecting functions of the endocrine system, such as insulin production. East notes, “consistent with the ADA Amendments Act’s plain language, the proposed rule says that the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures (other than ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses) shall not be considered in determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting. Examples in the proposed rule show how this principle would apply to individuals with a variety of impairments, such as diabetes that requires the use of insulin.” Attorney Brian East of Advocacy, Inc (

The new EEOC regulation’s effect will likely be that people with diseases will be held to have a disability under the ADA. In an attempt to broaden protection for individuals with disabilities, some will likely maintain that the new EEOC regulations are overly broad and will result in increased frivolous litigation. It is more likely, however, that the new regulations will simply make it more difficult for employers to successfully discriminate against employees with disabilities, which honors the original intent of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Imani Webb-Smith: Imani Webb-Smith is a Legal Intern with Workplace Fairness where she writes and edits content on a variety of labor and employment issues. She is currently in her second year at American University’s Washington College of Law.

In this down economy, many employers are undergoing layoffs of workers. Certainly, it can be harder to prove that your termination was discriminatory or retaliatory when many others are suffering the same fate as you are. But ask yourself this: was the layoff legitimately based upon financial reasons, and if so, why were you chosen?

As the California Supreme Court has explained, “Invocation of a right to downsize does not resolve whether the employer had a discriminatory motive for cutting back its work force, or engaged in intentional discrimination when deciding which individual workers to retain and release.” Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 358, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 (2000). See also, e.g., Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 1989) (jury could find retaliation in layoff which employer claimed was based on decline in workload, where employee provided contrary testimony and where other employees were not similarly laid off); Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 519-520 (D.C.Cir. 2000) (holding that a jury could have concluded that the agency’s explanation for not promoting the African-American plaintiff, downsizing, was inconsistent with its decision to promote three white co-workers, and hence a pretext for discrimination); Cichewicz v. UNOVA Indus. Automotive Systems, Inc., 92 Fed.Appx. 215, at **5 (6th Cir. 2004) (downsizing explanation insufficient to warrant summary judgment where there was evidence of pretext). If you were chosen for layoff over someone not of your protected classification who was less qualified, then you may still have a viable claim regarding your termination.

In a case in which I argued this last month against a summary judgment and summary adjudication motion, the employer – a relatively small company – laid off five workers, including my client, who was 50 at the time. My client was the only worker of his classification laid off, and a number were retained – including some who were similar in age to my client, and some who were ten or more years younger. I was able to distinguish my client from several workers of similar ages because they worked in different regions (geographically) than he did. Yet, the company was at first unable to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for retaining the younger workers instead of my client. When the company did present reasons other than age, they were only vague and non-specific ones (e.g., management felt that my client would be “less missed”), which (to the extent they meant anything at all) my client could readily refute.

Moreover, there were numerous instances in which a key decision-maker in the layoff had told my client that he felt the company needed to “get younger,” and that older workers cost the company more in benefits and wages, among other statements. This evidence suggests that the company’s weak reasons stated for choosing my client for layoff were just a pretext (or phony reason to cover up) for age discrimination. “With direct evidence of pretext, a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial. The plaintiff is required to produce very little direct evidence of the employer’s discriminatory intent to move past summary judgment.” Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal. (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 652 (citing Chuang v. University of California Davis, Bd. of Trustees (9th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3d 1115, 1127.

Based on the evidence I presented, Bryan Schwartz Law (http://www.bryanschwartzlaw.com/) and my co-counsel learned that the Court intends to deny the company’s effort to defeat the age discrimination claim arising from the layoff, allowing my client to proceed to trial to overturn his termination.

If you are notified of a layoff, think twice before assuming that you are out of options.

Disclaimer: Nothing in this posting is intended in any way to form an attorney-client relationship or any other contract. It is designed solely to provide general information about one area of the practice at Bryan Schwartz Law. Be mindful of any deadlines you have approaching that relate to your legal situation, and make sure that you meet them. Bryan Schwartz Law does not assume any responsibility for advice given regarding any aspect of your case until you have a signed legal services agreement engaging the firm’s representation.

About the Author: Bryan Schwartz is an Oakland, CA-based attorney specializing in civil rights, employment law. Call today – (510) 444-9300 – or send an email: Bryan@BryanSchwartzLaw.com

This article originally appeared in Bryan Schwartz Law on March 31, 2009. Re-printed with permission by the author.